

Weapons for the infantry were in part retained from earlier periods. Basic for the foot soldier was the dagger-axe (gǔ 戈), a knife-blade lashed to a pole:



The gǔ went back to Shāng. New at this time was the jǐ 戟 or halberd, which had a thrusting point; sometimes the slashing blade of the gǔ was added to the jǐ. The compound bow was the basic elite weapon. Elite warriors now also carried a full-length bronze sword, no longer a mere dagger as in Spring and Autumn. Armor of lacquered leather was available to the chariot warriors; the crossbow, which could drive a bolt through such armor, would soon appear.

The 04th Century

A Plan for Peace. Antiwar sentiment appears in an already developed form at the beginning of the 04c, in what was probably a speech by the founder of the Mician movement, Mwò Dí. The appeal of the speech is to law, but also to an intuitive sense of what is right (yì 義) and what is unkind (bù-rén 不仁).¹ The Micicians supported law; they merely asked that the state's law against murder should be consistently applied to the activities of the state itself:

4:3 (MZ 17:1-3, c0390). [1] Suppose someone enters another's orchard and filches his peaches and plums. When others hear of it, they will think it wrong, and the high officials will punish him if they can catch him. Why? Because he has injured another to benefit himself. Suppose someone steals another's dogs and pigs, his chickens and shoats; the wrong 不義 is worse than entering another's orchard and filching his peaches and plums. Why? Because the injury to the other is more, so the bù-rén 不仁 is greater, and the guilt is heavier.²

¹Modern persons tend to think of "right" as something conferred by a law, but yì is rather a prelegal "right;" simple social expectation.

²The injury is an attribute of the *victim*. If it was caused by chance, no guilt exists; guilt is an attribute of a *doer*. It is the "unkindness" of the deed, the doer's knowledge that it is harmful, that proves guilt. For intentionality 終 in 04c theory, see p80 n19.

If he enters another's barn and takes his horses and oxen, the *bù-rǎn* is greater than stealing another's dogs and pigs, his chickens and shoats. Why? Because the injury to the other is more. If the injury to the other is more, then the *bù-rǎn* is greater, and the guilt is heavier. If he kills an innocent man, strips him of gown and robe, and takes his axe and sword, the wrong is greater than entering another's barn and taking his horses and oxen. Why? Because the injury to the other is more, so the *bù-rǎn* is greater, and the guilt is heavier. With these things, the gentlemen of the world know to condemn them and call them wrong. But if we come to making a great attack on some state, they do *not* know to condemn it. Instead they go so far as to praise it, and call it right. Is this not what we should call failure to understand the difference between right and wrong?

[2] Killing one man they call wrong, and will surely judge it to be a capital crime. Extrapolating from this, killing ten men is ten times more wrong, and should incur ten capital punishments, and killing a hundred men is a hundred times more wrong, and should incur a hundred capital punishments. With these things, the gentlemen of the world know to condemn them and call them wrong. But if we come to the case of making a great and wrongful attack on some state, they do *not* know to condemn it. Instead they go so far as to write down their exploits to hand on to later ages. So they really do *not* know it is wrong, and so they write them down to hand on to later ages. If they knew it was a great wrong, why would they write it down to hand on to later ages?

The first two paragraphs establish a hierarchy of wrongs, with war at the top. The next paragraph proves that the ruling elite actually do regard war as right. The final section connects the two, showing that the ruling elite are utterly confused about right and wrong, and thus unfit to rule. It goes like this:

[3] Now, suppose there were a man who, when he saw a little black, called it black, but when he saw a lot of black, called it white: we would consider that this man did not know the difference between black and white. Or if when he tasted a little bitter he called it bitter, but when he tasted a lot of bitter he called it sweet: we would surely consider that this man did not know the difference between sweet and bitter. Now, when some small wrong is done, they know enough to call it wrong, but when a great wrong is done – attacking a state – they do not know enough to call it wrong; they even go so far as to praise it, calling it righteous 義. Can this be called knowing the difference between right and wrong? From this we may know that the gentlemen of the world are confused in their judgements of right 義 and wrong 不義.

This speech is remarkable for its length (longer than any other known piece of 05c or early 04c prose), and its seeming acquaintance with step-by-step legal argumentation, but especially for its criticism of the governments of the day.

With this attack on the war policies of the great states, there began an open discussion of public issues; a phenomenon later called the “Hundred Schools.”

It takes little wit to oppose war, but how would *peace* work? Three later essays give the Mician answer. (1) Love: People should extend love beyond their own families, avoiding the hatreds from which wars grow. (2) State frugality removes the economic motive for war. In particular, (3) the lavish funerals³ in which the elite increasingly indulged should be more modest.

Love. The “universal love” doctrine (jyēn ài 兼愛) conflicts with the deeply rooted filial piety value: the limitation of concern to one’s own family. The Micicians argued that universal love includes, and thus guarantees, filial love:

4:4 (MZ 14:3, excerpt, c0386). If the world loved others equally – if they loved others as much as they loved themselves – would any be unfilial? If they regarded their fathers and elder brothers as themselves, who would be unfilial? Would any be unkind? If people regarded sons and younger brothers as they did themselves, who would be unkind? So the unfilial and the unkind would not exist.

Would there still be robbers and thieves? If people regarded others’ households as their own, who would steal? If they regarded others as themselves, who would thief? So robbers and thieves would not exist.

Would there still be great officers throwing other clans into confusion, and feudal lords attacking other states? If they regarded others’ clans as their own, who would cause disorder? If they regarded others’ states as their own, who would attack? So great officers disordering other clans, and feudal lords attacking other states, would not exist.

If all the world would love others equally, state and state would not attack each other; clan and clan would not disorder each other; there would be no robbers or thieves; ruler and subject, father and son, would be filial and kind. And so the world would come to be well ordered.

Frugality. This piece (abbreviated in #2:12) stresses the burdens of war, and prescribes state frugality to cure state greed for other people’s wealth:

4:5 (MZ 20:3, excerpt, c0382). Modern governments have many ways to diminish the people. Their use of the people is wearisome, their levying of taxes is burdensome, and when the people’s resources are not enough, those who die of hunger and cold are innumerable. Moreover, the rulers make war and attack a neighboring state. The war may last a whole year, or at minimum, several months. Thus men and women cannot see each other for a long time. Is this not a way to diminish the people?⁴ Living in danger, eating and drinking irregularly, many become sick and die. Hiding in ambush, setting fires, besieging cities and battling in the open fields, innumerable men die . . .

³The oldest essay against extravagant funerals is lost, and thus is not quoted below.

⁴The early European demographers were also concerned that people should be able to marry, and thus procreate, at the ideal age. In modern times too, population is power.

The Micicians did not merely denounce *palace* extravagance, they deplored inessential ornament of every kind. This position ran counter to a general wish not to lower the current standard of living. How then does one urge frugality? The Micicians approach the subject with the idea of *doubling* social benefit:

4:6 (MZ 20:1, excerpt, c0382). When a Sage governs a state, the benefits to that state can be doubled. On a larger scale, when he governs the world, the benefits to the world can be doubled. This doubling is not from the taking of foreign territory, it is from eliminating, in both state and family, everything that is useless: this is enough to double the benefit. When a Sage King governs, when he issues an order or undertakes an enterprise, employs the people or uses resources, he does nothing but what has utility. Thus his use of resources is not wasteful, the people's strength 德 is not wearied, and the profits of his enterprises are many.

Why do we make clothing? To protect against cold in winter and heat in summer. The art of making clothing is to make one warm in winter and cool in summer. Decorations and ornaments we will not add; we will get rid of them.

Why do we make dwellings? To protect against wind and cold in winter, and heat and rain in summer. We add whatever gives strength. Decorations and ornaments we will not add; we will get rid of them . . .

All is to be minimal, in order to maximize the final social benefit. This position was later taken up by various Legalist and primitivist thinkers, and in that form found its way into mainstream perceptions. But as a program in its own right, the Micician vision of the peaceful society attracted no practical attention.

The Micicians nevertheless continued to assert their basic antiwar doctrine. At mid-century, they sarcastically characterized the warring rulers in this way:

4:7 (MZ 18:5, excerpt, c0362). Those who admire war say, They could not gather and use their masses, so they perished. I *can* gather and use my masses. If I then go to war with the world, who will dare not to submit?

Using the masses involved an extensive system of governmental organization, as the Chí theorists tell us:

4:8 (GZ 3:1, excerpt, c0356). In a state of a myriad chariots, the soldiers must have leaders. Its area being extensive, the countryside must have administrators. Its population being large, the bureaus must have heads. In managing the people's future, the court must have a policy . . .

But the same essay then goes on to point out, very much in the Micician vein, that government extravagance dooms the organizational effort:

4:9 (GZ 3:5, excerpt, c0356). If land has been brought under cultivation, but the state is still poor, it is because boats and carts are sumptuously ornamented, and terraces and palaces are spread over vast areas . . .

Legalists and Micicians were at one in decrying the extension of the old palace luxuries into the more affluent modern age.