4. War and Peace

The Spring and Autumn host (shī 師), the elite chariot force, had been led by the ruler or his delegate, usually a relative. To achieve more, a mass infantry army (jywn 軍) was needed, led by an expert, the general (jyàng 將). The transition to that kind of army had begun at the end of the 06c (page 37). One question for the state was, how to get ordinary people to fight for the state? That was solved by compulsion, and by the cultivation of a national identity.

The next question was, Given victory, how to incorporate the new territory? The answer was to use centrally appointed officials, not hereditary local rulers. The precedent was small conquests like Láng (page 24), which had been taken by Lǔ in early Spring and Autumn, or Dzvngdž's city of Wǔ-chvng (page 127), a late Spring and Autumn border strongpoint with a Lǔ-appointed governor.

The third question was, Why do this at all? Why not live at peace, as a system of mutually friendly states, trading back and forth and killing no one? So asked the Micians, the least predictable of the classical schools of thought.

The 05th Century

The New Soldiers were commoners. They did not have the elite warriors' lifelong training and ingrained dedication. They had to be forced to serve, and they did not like it much. This poem may be based on an early marching song. In what became the orthodox interpretation, it goes like this:

4:1 (Shī 36, Bèı #11, 05c?).

36A Worn down, alack; worn down, alack,
Why do we not go back?
Were it not our ruler's will,
What would we be doing in the chill?

36B Worn down, alack; worn down, alack,
Why do we not go back?
Were it not to serve our sire,
What would we be doing in the mire?

The original may have been sharper, but even read in a loyal way, it was felt to be too negative. Later, a more enthusiastic soldier piece was added to the Shī:

4:2 (Shī 133, Chín #8, excerpt, 04c?).

133A That you've no clothes, how can you say?
With you I'll share my robes so long;
The King is raising troops today,
And I've made ready a spearshaft strong –
Together we will march along . . .

The problem of how to get the common people to fight for the new style state has here been solved (or so we are told) by eager volunteers.

Weapons for the infantry were in part retained from earlier periods. Basic for the foot soldier was the dagger-axe (gv̄ 戈), a knife-blade lashed to a pole:

The gv̄ went back to Shāng. New at this time was the jǐ 戟 or halberd, which had a thrusting point; sometimes the slashing blade of the gv̄ was added to the jǐ. The compound bow was the basic elite weapon. Elite warriors now also carried a full-length bronze sword, no longer a mere dagger as in Spring and Autumn. Armor of lacquered leather was available to the chariot warriors; the crossbow, which could drive a bolt through such armor, would soon appear.

The 04th Century

A Plan for Peace. Antiwar sentiment appears in an already developed form at the beginning of the 04c, in what was probably a speech by the founder of the Mician movement, Mwò Dí. The appeal of the speech is to law, but also to an intuitive sense of what is right (yì 義) and what is unkind (bù-rv́n 不仁).[1] The Micians supported law; they merely asked that the state's law against murder should be consistently applied to the activities of the state itself:

> **4:3** (MZ 17:1-3, c0390). [1] Suppose someone enters another's orchard and filches his peaches and plums. When others hear of it, they will think it wrong, and the high officials will punish him if they can catch him. Why? Because he has injured another to benefit himself. Suppose someone steals another's dogs and pigs, his chickens and shoats; the wrong 不義 is worse than entering another's orchard and filching his peaches and plums. Why? Because the injury to the other is more, so the bù-rv́n 不仁 is greater, and the guilt is heavier.[2]

[1]Modern persons tend to think of "right" as something conferred by a law, but yì is rather a prelegal "right;" simple social expectation.

[2]The injury is an attribute of the *victim*. If it was caused by chance, no guilt exists; guilt is an attribute of a *doer*. It is the "unkindness" of the deed, the doer's knowledge that it is harmful, that proves guilt. For intentionality 終 in 04c theory, see p80 n19.

> If he enters another's barn and takes his horses and oxen, the bù-rǘn is greater than stealing another's dogs and pigs, his chickens and shoats. Why? Because the injury to the other is more. If the injury to the other is more, then the bù-rǘn is greater, and the guilt is heavier. If he kills an innocent man, strips him of gown and robe, and takes his axe and sword, the wrong is greater than entering another's barn and taking his horses and oxen. Why? Because the injury to the other is more, so the bù-rǘn is greater, and the guilt is heavier. With these things, the gentlemen of the world know to condemn them and call them wrong. But if we come to making a great attack on some state, they do *not* know to condemn it. Instead they go so far as to praise it, and call it right. Is this not what we should call failure to understand the difference between right and wrong?
>
> [2] Killing one man they call wrong, and will surely judge it to be a capital crime. Extrapolating from this, killing ten men is ten times more wrong, and should incur ten capital punishments, and killing a hundred men is a hundred times more wrong, and should incur a hundred capital punishments. With these things, the gentlemen of the world know to condemn them and call them wrong. But if we come to the case of making a great and wrongful attack on some state, they do *not* know to condemn it. Instead they go so far as to write down their exploits to hand on to later ages. So they really do *not* know it is wrong, and so they write them down to hand on to later ages. If they knew it was a great wrong, why would they write it down to hand on to later ages?

The first two paragraphs establish a hierarchy of wrongs, with war at the top. The next paragraph proves that the ruling elite actually do regard war as right. The final section connects the two, showing that the ruling elite are utterly confused about right and wrong, and thus unfit to rule. It goes like this:

> [3] Now, suppose there were a man who, when he saw a little black, called it black, but when he saw a lot of black, called it white: we would consider that this man did not know the difference between black and white. Or if when he tasted a little bitter he called it bitter, but when he tasted a lot of bitter he called it sweet: we would surely consider that this man did not know the difference between sweet and bitter. Now, when some small wrong is done, they know enough to call it wrong, but when a great wrong is done – attacking a state – they do not know enough to call it wrong; they even go so far as to praise it, calling it righteous 義. Can this be called knowing the difference between right and wrong? From this we may know that the gentlemen of the world are confused in their judgements of right 義 and wrong 不義.

This speech is remarkable for its length (longer than any other known piece of 05c or early 04c prose), and its seeming acquaintance with step-by-step legal argumentation, but especially for its criticism of the governments of the day.

With this attack on the war policies of the great states, there began an open discussion of public issues; a phenomenon later called the "Hundred Schools."

It takes little wit to oppose war, but how would *peace* work? Three later essays give the Mician answer. (1) Love: People should extend love beyond their own families, avoiding the hatreds from which wars grow. (2) State frugality removes the economic motive for war. In particular, (3) the lavish funerals[3] in which the elite increasingly indulged should be more modest.

Love. The "universal love" doctrine (jyēn ài 兼愛) conflicts with the deeply rooted filial piety value: the limitation of concern to one's own family. The Micians argued that universal love includes, and thus guarantees, filial love:

> **4:4** (MZ 14:3, excerpt, c0386). If the world loved others equally – if they loved others as much as they loved themselves – would any be unfilial? If they regarded their fathers and elder brothers as themselves, who would be unfilial? Would any be unkind? If people regarded sons and younger brothers as they did themselves, who would be unkind? So the unfilial and the unkind would not exist.
>
> Would there still be robbers and thieves? If people regarded others' households as their own, who would steal? If they regarded others as themselves, who would thieve? So robbers and thieves would not exist.
>
> Would there still be great officers throwing other clans into confusion, and feudal lords attacking other states? If they regarded others' clans as their own, who would cause disorder? If they regarded others' states as their own, who would attack? So great officers disordering other clans, and feudal lords attacking other states, would not exist.
>
> If all the world would love others equally, state and state would not attack each other; clan and clan would not disorder each other; there would be no robbers or thieves; ruler and subject, father and son, would be filial and kind. And so the world would come to be well ordered.

Frugality. This piece (abbreviated in #**2:12**) stresses the burdens of war, and prescribes state frugality to cure state greed for other people's wealth:

> **4:5** (MZ 20:3, excerpt, c0382). Modern governments have many ways to diminish the people. Their use of the people is wearisome, their levying of taxes is burdensome, and when the people's resources are not enough, those who die of hunger and cold are innumerable. Moreover, the rulers make war and attack a neighboring state. The war may last a whole year, or at minimum, several months. Thus men and women cannot see each other for a long time. Is this not a way to diminish the people?[4] Living in danger, eating and drinking irregularly, many become sick and die. Hiding in ambush, setting fires, besieging cities and battling in the open fields, innumerable men die . . .

[3]The oldest essay against extravagant funerals is lost, and thus is not quoted below.

[4]The early European demographers were also concerned that people should be able to marry, and thus procreate, at the ideal age. In modern times too, population is power.

The Micians did not merely denounce *palace* extravagance, they deplored inessential ornament of every kind. This position ran counter to a general wish not to lower the current standard of living. How then does one urge frugality? The Micians approach the subject with the idea of *doubling* social benefit:

> **4:6** (MZ 20:1, excerpt, c0382). When a Sage governs a state, the benefits to that state can be doubled. On a larger scale, when he governs the world, the benefits to the world can be doubled. This doubling is not from the taking of foreign territory, it is from eliminating, in both state and family, everything that is useless: this is enough to double the benefit. When a Sage King governs, when he issues an order or undertakes an enterprise, employs the people or uses resources, he does nothing but what has utility. Thus his use of resources is not wasteful, the people's strength 德 is not wearied, and the profits of his enterprises are many.
>
> Why do we make clothing? To protect against cold in winter and heat in summer. The art of making clothing is to make one warm in winter and cool in summer. Decorations and ornaments we will not add; we will get rid of them.
>
> Why do we make dwellings? To protect against wind and cold in winter, and heat and rain in summer. We add whatever gives strength. Decorations and ornaments we will not add; we will get rid of them . . .

All is to be minimal, in order to maximize the final social benefit. This position was later taken up by various Legalist and primitivist thinkers, and in that form found its way into mainstream perceptions. But as a program in its own right, the Mician vision of the peaceful society attracted no practical attention.

The Micians nevertheless continued to assert their basic antiwar doctrine. At mid-century, they sarcastically characterized the warring rulers in this way:

> **4:7** (MZ 18:5, excerpt, c0362). Those who admire war say, They could not gather and use their masses, so they perished. I *can* gather and use my masses. If I then go to war with the world, who will dare not to submit?

Using the masses involved an extensive system of governmental organization, as the Chí theorists tell us:

> **4:8** (GZ 3:1, excerpt, c0356). In a state of a myriad chariots, the soldiers must have leaders. Its area being extensive, the countryside must have administrators. Its population being large, the bureaus must have heads. In managing the people's future, the court must have a policy . . .

But the same essay then goes on to point out, very much in the Mician vein, that government extravagance dooms the organizational effort:

> **4:9** (GZ 3:5, excerpt, c0356). If land has been brought under cultivation, but the state is still poor, it is because boats and carts are sumptuously ornamented, and terraces and palaces are spread over vast areas . . .

Legalists and Micians were at one in decrying the extension of the old palace luxuries into the more affluent modern age.

The Art of War was being developed in Chí at this time; its stages are recorded in the Sūndž (page 85). The mass army could do things that the old chariot force could not, such as operate on hilly or marshy ground. From the oldest layer in the Sūndž, we have this very elementary paragraph:

> **4:10** (Sūndž 9, excerpt, c0360). To cross mountains: follow the passes, search out tenable ground, occupy the heights. If the enemy hold the heights, do not ascend to engage them in battle. This is the way to deploy an army in the mountains.

Don't fight uphill. This, the most basic principle of land warfare, did not need to be stated for the old chariot force, which only operated on level ground. For low and wet ground, where all movement is difficult, we have this:

> **4:11** (Sūndž 9, excerpt, c0360). To cross salt marshes and wetlands, focus on quickly getting free of them; do not remain. If you do battle in marshes or wetlands, stay in areas with marsh grass, and keep groves of trees at your back. This is the way to deploy the army in marshes or wetlands.

That is, keep moving, and protect your back. A later terrain list focused not on ground as such but on the tactical implications of a particular type of terrain:

> **4:12** (Sūndž 11A, excerpt, c0340). When there are mountains and forests, ravines and defiles, wetlands and marshes, or where the road is hard to negotiate, it is entrapping terrain. Where entry is constricted and return indirect, or where with few they can strike our force, it is encircled terrain . . . On entrapping terrain, keep moving. On encircled terrain, use strategy.

Combat is to be avoided where possible. This agrees with the mindset of Spring and Autumn warfare (page 24): get it done, but with the least possible loss.

At first, the new-style leader had to consider the feelings of the recruits:

> **4:13** (Sūndž 9, excerpt, c0360). If you impose punishment on the troops before they have become attached to you, they will not be submissive, and if they are not submissive, they will be difficult to employ. If you do not impose punishments after the troops have become attached, they cannot be used. Thus, if you command them with the civil and unify them with the martial, this is what we call being able to take [command of] them.

Later on, the element of persuasion vanishes, and orders are followed:

> **4:14** (Sūndž 11A, excerpt, c0340). Throw the troops into a situation in which there is nowhere to go, and they will stand fast to the death. Faced with death, what can they not achieve? Officers and men will put forth all their strength. When troops and officers are in peril, they are not afraid; when there is nowhere to go, they are resolute; when deep [in enemy territory] they pull together. When there is no alternative, they will fight.
>
> Thus, the troops: without specific orders they will be ranged aright, without assigned objective they will succeed, without prior conditioning they will be cohesive, without previous instruction they can be relied on.

Mǎ-líng. In 0343, Chí troops led by Tyén Pàn, but with Sūn Bìn as their commander, defeated a Ngwèı army at Mǎ-líng – *in the Ngwèı home territory*. This raised the possibility that one state might conquer a distant rival, and thus unify the world. So encouraged was the Chí ruler that in the following year he abandoned the title Prince (gūng 公) and assumed the title King (wáng 王), which until then had been solely held[5] by the Jōu ruler.

Chí was now openly committed to a policy of unification by military force. The second phase of the Warring States period had begun.

PUBLIC CULTURE

Not everything in the period was produced by individuals, or even states. There were also texts generally known and commanding wide acceptance. The Shī, performed at more than one regional court, and thus the common property of the diplomatic elite, are the prime example. Within its circle,[6] there was also the Dzwǒ Jwàn, with its more detailed pictures of a more recent antiquity. In both texts, over the 04c, we can observe the effect of war on the public culture. It was this: war insinuated itself ever more intimately into the public culture. Here are two contrasts, one from each of these more or less public texts.

Shī 268. In this older poem, Wv́n-wáng, celebrated as the first Jōu King, has the character we would expect from his posthumous title (wv́n 文, "civil" as contrasted with wǔ 武 "military"): preparing, not achieving, the conquest. His role here is to establish the ceremonies on which the identity of Jōu rested:

4:15 (Shr 268, 05c?) Pellucid, and shining bright[7] –
The ordinances of King Wv́n.
He established the sacrifices.
And now they have had their fulfilment:
The good omens of Jōu.

Shī 285. Here, in a hymn whose words were partly taken from an old dance song, are the two in their usual relationship: Wv́n preparing, Wǔ achieving:

4:16 (Shī 285, 05c?) August were you, King Wǔ,
Incomparable in your glory.
Well had labored King Wv́n,
Opening a path for those to follow;
Then did Wǔ receive it,
Conquering Yīn, ending its cruelties;
And firmly establishing your merit.

This is the picture that we all knew.

[5]In the Sinitic world. The non-Sinitic state of Chǔ had always called its rulers Kings.

[6]Which seems to have included both the Micians and Mencius; see Brooks **Heaven**.

[7]Brightness is the standard attribute of the sacred, in this and other cultures.

Stunningly different is the Wv́n-wáng we meet in one long and late poem: a conqueror rather than a preparatory builder.

Shī 241 recounts the exploits of some previous rulers, and then orders Wv́n-wáng to make war in his turn:

4:17 (Shī 241E, 04c) God said to King Wv́n:
"Be not content to remain idle,
Or to follow your own liking."
And so he first ascended the heights:
The people of Mì were disrespectful,
Daring to oppose our great domain.
He invaded Rwǎn and beset Gūng.
The King was majestic in his wrath,
As he set in order his forces
To block the opposing forces,
To secure the prosperity of Jōu,
To respond to All Under Heaven . . .

The crime of Mì, it would appear, is a wish not to be conquered by Jōu. This is resented, not of course by the Jōu, who are dutiful throughout, but by God on High (Shàng Dì 上帝), who evidently has charge of everything that is. Next, God orders the King to proceed against Chúng (**#3:11**), and the poem ends:

241H Towers and rams[8] wrought steadily,
The walls of Chúng towered high.
The captives were brought forward in rows,
Heads were cut off in great number;[9]
These he sacrificed; these he offered,
These he annexed; these he subdued –
In the four directions, none resisted.
Towers and rams wrought constantly,
The walls of Chúng held stoutly firm.
These he attacked; these he beset,
These he cut off; these he destroyed –
In the four directions, none opposed.

This recasting of King Wv́n as a conqueror of cities undoubtedly reinforced the militarization of 04c Warring States society – victory is now to be achieved, not by virtuous waiting, but by vigorous fighting.

The appearance of the term All Under Heaven (tyēn-syà 天下) is ominous. The object of conquest is no longer the other Sinitic states, or them plus the long-intermingled non-Sinitic states, but the entire world, which is to be brought into the Sinitic sphere at the command of a universal Sinitic God.

[8]Siege devices of the 04c and later; not known in the days of early Jōu.

[9]Not ears (as a token representing heads), as in later usage. The heads and the still live captives were all offered as trophies of the victory.

Methodological Moment. How ancient, how widely distributed in the Shī, is this sensitive term tyēn-syà? Checking in the concordance (it is not necessary to know Chinese), and eliminating occurrences in the included commentary, we find one other case: Shī 205B1 溥天之下. And from an earlier Methodological Moment (page 46), we know the status of Shī 205B: It is an interpolation.

Right.

Dzwǒ Jwàn. The Shī, Dzwǒ Jwàn, and early Chinese literature in general, do not abound in battle descriptions. Those who approach this literature with the Iliad ringing in their ears are courting disappointment. Battles in DJ serve chiefly as background for moral conversations between individuals. But those conversations do reflect attitudes to war in the period when DJ was composed, that is, most of the 04c. Here are two stages in that evolution.

(1) The Battle of Bì. Jvng was the pivot state in the attempts of Chǔ to penetrate the north, and those of Jìn and other states to prevent it. Jvng has just been defeated by Chǔ, and has made peace with Chǔ. Jìn had sent out a force to aid Jvng, but on finding that Jvng and Chǔ have made peace, most of the Jìn leaders counsel withdrawal, citing Chǔ's magnanimity and good civic order. We join the story just as the Jìn force has reached a decision point. Our speaker urges that respect for good order in Chǔ requires that Jìn withdraw its army:

> **4:18** (DJ 7/12:2, excerpt, c0315). When they reached the [Yellow] River, they learned that Jvng had made peace with Chǔ. Hwándž wished to return, saying, We did not get to Jvng in time, and we will now merely weary our people: what is the use of that? If Chǔ returns and then moves [again], it will not be too late [to react]. Swéı Wùdž said, Good. I have heard that in using an army, one waits for an opportunity and then moves. But when the virtue [of a state], its use of punishments, its administration, its conduct of affairs, its regulations, and its rituals have not changed, it cannot be opposed.[10] We should not carry out this mission.
>
> When the Chǔ army attacked Jvng, it was moved by anger at its duplicity, and [then] by compassion for its humility.[11] When it rebelled, [Chǔ] attacked it; when it submitted, [Chǔ] forgave it – its kindness and its severity were both perfect. To attack the rebellious is severity; to be mild with the submitted is virtue . . .

[10]Have not changed from the ideal state in which they anciently were. That a virtuous state cannot be successfully attacked is a common thought in 04c and 03c texts, both Chinese and Indian. This DJ story develops the theme at enormous length.

[11]Its duplicity in siding with Jìn, and the abject stance of its ruler toward Chǔ once it had been conquered by Chǔ. These are emotionally and morally intelligible responses, and thus do not justify Jìn's proceeding against the Chǔ force.

> In the year just past, [Chǔ] entered Chýn. Now it has entered Jỳng. But its people are not worn out, its ruler is not the object of resentments or complaints: its administration is along correct lines. When its troops are arrayed in formation, its traders, farmers, artisans, and merchants are not hindered in their occupations, and footsoldiers and elite warriors are on good terms; its undertakings do not conflict . . .
>
> When virtue is established, when punishments are implemented, when the administration is perfected, when affairs are timely, when regulations are followed, when the rules of propriety are respected – how should we make them an enemy? When one sees a possibility, one advances; when one is aware of difficulties, one withdraws: this is the correct ordering of an army. To annex the weak and attack the deluded: this is the correct principle of war. Will you for the present so order the army, and so form your plans? There are still the weak and deluded; why must it be Chǔ?

The speech concludes with a flurry of Shī and Shū quotations. It is met by a rejoinder representing the warrior's code of personal honor:

> [Syēn Gǔ, second in command of the army of the center] said, It will not do. The way Jìn became Hegemon was the might of its armies and the strength of its officers. Now, we have lost the loyalty of the Lords:[12] this cannot be called strength. We have an enemy whom we do not pursue; this cannot be called might. If through my actions we lose the Hegemony, it would be better if I should die. And still more, having formed our army and gone forth, if we retreat on hearing that the enemy is strong, it would be unmanly. If commanded to be a leader of the army, but in the end to be unmanly – the lot of you may be capable of this, but I will not do it.
>
> And as Assistant Commander of the army of the center, he crossed the River.

The outcome, reached after pages of further debate among both the Jìn and Chǔ leaders, is an attack, and a defeat, for Jìn. The contrast is between a deliberative and morally sensitive advisor, who knows the civil strength conferred by sound institutions, and an impetuous old-style military man, who is aware of nothing but his own personal valor and shame.[13]

[12]That is, Jìn has lost Jỳng, which is now allied with Chǔ.

[13]Just this contrast, and this approval of the deliberative option, is expressed by "Confucius" in LY *7:11, an 04c interpolation in an 05c Analects chapter. We add it as **#4:19** – The Master said to Yén Ywǣn, "When they use him, he acts; when they cast him aside, he waits – it is only you and I that have this, is it not so?" Dž-lù [eager to ask a question with himself as the answer] said, "If the Master were in charge of the Three Armies, who would he have as associate?" The Master said, "One who would rush a tiger or breast a river, who would die without a regret – I would *not* associate with. What I need is one who manages with caution, and prefers to succeed by consultation." The DJ story may be taken as a long dramatization of this principle.

So far our first example, which shows that awareness of moral categories leads to military success. It is more or less what we would expect from the DJ. The next example is famous precisely because it violates that expectation.

(2) The Battle of the Húng River. Sùng had invaded Jvng:

> **4:20** (DJ 5/22:8, excerpt, c0315). An officer of Chŭ attacked Sùng to relieve Jvng, and the Prince of Sùng was about to give battle. The Grand Marshal strongly remonstrated, saying, It is long since Heaven abandoned Shāng.[14] You wish to raise it again, but that will not be permitted." He did not listen. In winter, in the 11th month, on the 6th cyclical day, at the new moon, the Prince of Sùng and the officer of Chŭ battled at Húng River. The men of Sùng had formed their ranks, but the men of Chŭ had not yet finished crossing. The Marshal said, They are many and we are few. While they have not yet finished crossing, I ask permission to strike them. The Prince said, It cannot be done. When they had finished crossing but had not yet formed their ranks, [the Marshal] again made his request. The Prince said, It cannot yet be done; when they are in formation, then strike them. The Sùng host was severely defeated, the Prince was wounded in the thigh, and his personal guard were slain. The people of the state all blamed the Prince. The Prince said, A gentleman will not inflict a second wound, he will not take captive the gray-haired. When the ancients made war, they did not attack those in awkward situations. This Lonely One, though a remnant of a defeated state, will not sound the drum[15] against those not drawn up.
>
> [Marshal] Dž-yẃ said, Our ruler does not understand battle. A stronger enemy in an awkward situation or not drawn up is Heaven helping us. If we could drum against them in that situation, is that not permissible? We would still be anxious about [the outcome]. As for today's strong ones, they are all our enemies. Even if there are aged among them, if we take them we should keep them captive; what has it to do with "gray hair?" In teaching war, we stress the principle of shame,[16] seeking that [our soldiers] should kill the enemy. If we wound, but the enemy is not yet dead, why should we not inflict a second wound? If we forbear a second wound, we might as well not wound at all. If we forbear with the gray-haired, we might as well submit to them. The Three Armies are to be used for advantage. Its bronze [trumpets] and drums are to rouse fighting spirit. If we are to use it to advantage, then attacking them in an awkward situation is permissible. When spirits are high and morale is strong, to drum against the foe is permissible.

Here is the modern, the expedient, note in warfare.[17] What works is good.

[14]It was the Shāng heritage that was preserved in Warring States Sùng.

[15]The signal to attack was given by the drum.

[16]Shame at failing in duty to the state.

[17]We add a marginal **#4:21** (Sūndž 1:26, c0303). "Attack where he is unprepared."

These are the contrasting Dzwǒ Jwàn examples. As the notes show, they have resonances in other 04c texts, particularly the military theory of the Sūndž. These and the Shī examples record the militarizing of contemporary culture, and even the contemporary culture's idea of its own past. That process would continue into the 03c as well.

Chín, which had lagged behind Chí, now began to produce military theory. At first, Chín celebrated not the skill of the general but the organizational prowess of the government. This essay, probably presented to King Hwèı of Chín, portrays a belligerent populace which did not need to be induced to fight, but only to have its fighting spirit directed against other states:

> **4:22** (SJS 10 core, c0324).[18] The whole art of war is founded on victories of administration, so that the people do not contend, or if they do contend, it is not from personal motivation: they take their motivation from their superiors. Thus, the effect of the government of a King is to make the people shy of squabbling in the square, but bold in battling with the bandits.[19] As the people grow accustomed to attacking difficult situations with all their strength, they will accordingly come to make light of death.
>
> The soldiers of a King are not arrogant in victory or resentful in defeat. They are not arrogant in victory because the strategy (shù 術) leading to victory is clear to them. They are not resentful in defeat because they know where they have fallen short in executing it. If over time the administration holds the winning strategy, it will be strong enough to reach the Kingship. If the people are submissive and listen to their superiors, the state will be rich and its armies victorious. One who can walk this path will be able to maintain Kingship indefinitely.
>
> Thus the general in using the people is like the driver of a fine horse: he must keep it up to the mark.

The aggressiveness of the Chín populace doubtless worked in Chín's favor. Another saying, part of which is attributed by some to the 04c theorist Shvn Dàu,[20] picks up the theme of the superiority of the untrained soldier:

> **4:23** (LSCC 8/3:1, excerpt, c0241). A current maxim says, If you collect people from the marketplace and go to war with them, you can be victorious over another's well-paid and trained troops. The old, weak, and worn-out can be victorious over another's picked men and drilled soldiers. Disorganized convicts can be victorious over another's mobile formations and fixed ranks. Hoes, harrows, and plain clubs can be victorious over another's long spears and sharp weapons 利兵.

This sounds counterintuitive. How is it supposed to work?

[18]The core is recovered by removing some phrases later added from the Sūndž.

[19]A standard term for enemy soldiers, who are always seen as wrongful intruders.

[20]Thompson **Shen** p290 (#105).

Citizenship. One possibility might be the determination of the convinced citizen and grateful subject. So Mencius claimed in 0320:

> **4:24** (MC 1A5, excerpt, 0320). If the King gives the people a benevolent government, being sparing of punishments and fines and frugal in imposing taxes and levies, they will plough deep and weed carefully, and their able-bodied in days of leisure will cultivate filiality, fraternity, loyalty, and good faith. At home, they will thus be able to serve their fathers and older brothers; outside the home, they will be able to serve their elders and superiors. With nothing but sharpened sticks, one can use them to oppose the strong armor and sharp weapons of Chín and Chǔ.

Instead of the already bellicose populace of SJS 10 (#**4:22**), we have a grateful and thus motivated populace. *This is something government can do.*

Position. Back east, the Sūndž moved from specifics to principles. Its most famous concept is shì 勢, "position," a situation seen as the ground of possible action. The dual attack of Chí on Lǔ in 0556 (#**1:49**) now finds its realization: the front and flank of the single army give it a flexible two-army potential:

> **4:25** (Sūndž 5, excerpts, c0318). Sūndž said, Controlling many is like controlling few; the principle is to distinguish units by size. Fighting against many is like fighting against few; the principle is to assign responsibilities and penalties.[21] That the mass of the Three Armies can be made to receive the attack of the enemy and never be defeated, is the principle of flank (chí 奇) and front (jèng 正). The army's advantage, like throwing a stone against an egg, consists in the principle of empty and full.[22] In combat, we use the frontal attack to hold, the flank attack to win.

The two forces are not separated, but coordinated against the same object.

> Therefore the general who is good at flank attacks is as inexhaustible as Heaven and Earth . . . Military situations consist of no more than flank and front, but the variations of flank and front are innumerable. Flank and front grow out of each other, just as a jade ring has no ends: who could exhaust them?[23] . . . Thus those who are good at moving the enemy assume a certain disposition (syíng 形), and the enemy must conform to it. I offer something, and the enemy must accept it. I tempt him with advantage, and await him with my troops.[24] Therefore, one good at war seeks victory from the position (shì), and does not assign responsibility to men. Thus he is able to select his men, and master the situation (shì).

The novel idea here is strength against weakness. But superior strength must be concealed (as in the flank attack), not flaunted (as in the frontal attack).

[21]Syíng-míng 形名, a principle which is also used to control the civil bureaucracy, means assigning tasks and holding individuals responsible for their accomplishment.

[22]The "empty" are the undefended or lightly defended points in the enemy situation.

[23]An opposed flank attack may become a holding action; one shifts into the other.

[24]The general who can compel the enemy's movements holds the tactical initiative.

Secrecy. Somewhat later, in arguing with its philosophical contemporaries, the DDJ insisted that its treasures were too subtle for ordinary minds:

4:26 (DDJ 41, excerpt, c0306).

> The clear Way seems worthless,
> The bright Way seems commonplace,
> The advancing Way seems like withdrawal.

The last line may have caught the fancy of the Sūndž compilers, who in putting the last touches on their work added this, on war as a Way of Dissimulation:

> **4:27** (Sūndž 1, excerpt, c0305). War is a Way of deception. Thus when you are capable, show him incapacity; when you are putting something in motion, show him that you are not. When you are near, show him that you are far; when you are far, show him that you are near. With the seemingly attractive entice him, with seeming disorder take him.

Better Weapons. The crossbow was developed in Chǔ from a folk weapon of the southern peoples.[25] The improved version, with a high-precision bronze trigger mechanism, could drive a bolt through leather armor; it was known in Chí by the late 04c[26] and is mentioned in Sūndž 5 (c0318) and 2 (c0311). Long bronze swords appeared. By the 03c, Chǔ was making sword blades of steel.

All this took money. But there was a way to shift some of the cost to the enemy: this was to *plunder* the enemy. Here are two reflections on that policy:

> **4:28** (Sūndž 2, excerpts, c0311). Sūndž said, Operations of war require a thousand fast four-horse chariots, a thousand leather-covered [supply] carts, and ten myriad men with armor. Provisions for a thousand-league march campaign, what with internal and external wastage, the needs of the consultants, such materials as glue and lacquer, and the provision of carriages and armor, will come to a thousand of gold per day. After that has been secured, a host of ten myriad may be raised . . .
>
> If you obtain your equipment from within the state, but rely on seizing provisions from the enemy, then the army's food supply will be enough.

> **4:29** (MZ 19:3, excerpt, c0326). They cut down grainfields and fell trees; they tear down the inner and outer walls and fill in ditches and ponds; they seize and kill sacrificial animals and burn down ancestral temples; they kill the people and exterminate the aged and weak . . .

It may be doubted that this will win the affections of the conquered.

[25]The older form, an untended setbow with a release device and a poisoned arrow, was still known or remembered among the Myáu 苗 of southwestern China in the early 20c, as witness this tale: ". . . strung his crossbow and set it on the old tiger's path. They . . . slept until next morning, then went to see whether the tigers had come . . . At midnight the tigers *had* come, and had run into their bow and crossbow, and the poisoned arrow had pierced the old tiger's liver." (Graham **Songs** 124).

[26]For details, see Wagner **Iron** sv Crossbow.

The Micians, now themselves in office, had come to accept just (義) war. They made a distinction in terms:

> **4:30** (MZ 19:5, excerpt, c0326). The warring lords would gloss over their conduct with counter-arguments, saying, Do you condemn aggression and attack as wrong and not beneficial? But in ancient times, Yŭ made war on the Myáu, Tāng attacked 桀 Jyé,[27] and King Wŭ attacked 紂 Jòu.[28] Yet these are held to be Sage Kings. How do you explain this? Mwòdž said, You have not examined the terms of my teaching, and you do not understand its purport. That is not what one calls "aggression" 攻, but rather "punishment" 誅.

Defensive Warfare. The Micians still opposed bad wars, and even took the field against them. Having acquired a capability in defensive warfare, they hired themselves out to threatened cities. This made sieges more difficult:

> **4:31** (Sūndž 8, excerpt, c0334). Some cities are not to be assaulted . . .
>
> **4:32** (Sūndž 3, excerpt, c0312). The highest realization of warfare is to attack the enemy's plans, the next is to attack their alliances, next to attack their army, and last to attack their cities . . . This tactic of attacking cities is adopted only when it is unavoidable . . .

So in less than a generation, the difficulty of sieges has increased.

Separately, Mician antiwar propaganda was having its effect, and the Chī statecraft people deplored that result:

> **4:33** (GZ 4:9 "Nine Ways To Lose It," excerpt, c0310).
>
> 1. If disarmament theories prevail, the passes will not be defended.
> 2. If "universal love" theories prevail, the soldiers will not fight.

The Northern Steppe. The states bordering on the northern grasslands, Chín in the west, Jàu in the center, and Yēn in the east, had been expanding into that area, but toward the end of the 04c, there was a counterpressure: something like a unified military leadership had recently emerged in the steppe, and mounted archers were troubling the border. This provoked a reference to the supposed ancient minister Gwăn Jùng, who by his organization of the state of Chí had saved all the Sinitic states from conquest by the non-Sinitic hordes, or so it was thought, at this time:

> **4:34** (LY 14:17, excerpt, c0310) . . . The Master said, Hwán-gūng was the leader of the Lords, and united All Under Heaven; the people down to the present receive the benefit of it. Without Gwăn Jùng, we would be wearing our hair long and lapping our robes to the left . . .

Meaning, we would have been conquered by the northern peoples, and would now be culturally absorbed into their way of living.

[27]The evil last ruler of the Syà dynasty, killed by the founder of Shāng.

[28]The evil last ruler of the Shāng Dynasty, killed by the founder of Jōu.

But just that change was happening. Horses had been *driven* for centuries, but trousers were now adopted, to permit the *riding* of horses. The stirrup and the long cavalry sword appeared somewhat later. By the middle of the 03c, cavalry had become part of Sinitic warfare.

Methodological Moment. Most evidence suggests that the pressure which led to adoption of non-Sinitic clothing (胡服) for at least the Sinitic cavalry, occurred in the late 04c (the Shī Jì 15 date is 0307). Why not earlier? Because the earlier Analects passage which implies the existence of a steppe political organization and thus combined steppe military pressure . . .

> **4:35** (LY 3:4). Lín Fàng asked about ritual. The Master said, Great indeed is this question! In ceremonies, than lavish, be rather sparing; in funerals, than detached, be rather moved.
>
> **4:36** (LY 3:5). The Master said, The Yí and Dí [peoples] *with* rulers are not the equal of the several Syà states *without* them.
>
> **4:37** (LY 3:6). The Jì were going to sacrifice to Mount Tàı. The Master said to Răn Yŏu, Can you not save the situation? He replied, I cannot. The Master said, Alas! Who will say that Mount Tàı is not as good as Lín Fàng?

. . . is an obvious interruption, and thus a later insertion.[29] It was added to a mostly ritual chapter (LY 3, c0342) because clothing had ritual meaning.

Two Geostrategies. The problem for Chí was that it needed more army, and more army required more land, and the only land into which it could now expand was the neighboring Sinitic states. This it did, but with evil results. In 0315, the King of Yēn abdicated in favor of his minister. His heir's supporters resisted. Chí, advised by Mencius, entered Yēn and restored order. Chí then *annexed* Yēn, thus doubling its area. This (page 135) provoked a reaction from other states, which in 0314 combined to expel Chí from Yēn and establish an heir as King of Yēn. This restored what we now call the balance of powers.

The shock of this disaster was also felt in Lŭ. The DDJ school had always advocated caution. On the brink of the Chí venture, they issued this warning:

> **4:38** (DDJ 29, excerpt, c0315).
> Some wish to conquer the world and control it;
> I see they will not be able to succeed.
> The world is a sacred vessel; it cannot be controlled.
> Those who would control it will spoil it;
> Those who would grasp it will lose it.

[29]This is one of the few Analects interpolations noticed by the commentators as interrupting a thematic pair (mention of Lín Fàng). See further Brooks **Analects** 127.

Once the results were in, DDJ yet more strongly warned of overreaching:

4:39 (DDJ 30, c0314).

He who by Dàu would aid the leader of men
will not wish to be stronger in arms than all the world.
The good man will get his result and nothing more;
he will not dare use it to take a position of strength.[30]
He will get his result and not flaunt it,
get his result and not be vain of it,
get his result and not brag of it.
This is called
Get your result but be not strong –
Such things are like to last for long.

Flaunting your strength will only lead to reprisals from other states.

Chín, in the west, had an advantage: it could expand into areas whose conquest did not provoke a military response from the Sinitic states. In 0316, it had entered the large but remote and non-Sinitic realm of Shŭ, conquered it, and begun to develop it as a food-producing area.[31] The absorption of this region, which doubled the area of Chín, passed without any notice in the east. What *was* noticed was that Chín (engaged in digesting its tremendous addition) was less active against its neighbors, Ngwèı on the east and Chŭ on the south. This lull was taken as an omen by a late passage in the Dzwŏ Jwàn, which is certain that the cruelties of Chín Mù-gūng[32] prove that savage Chín must fail:

4:40 (DJ 6/6:3b, excerpt, c0319) . . . Not only had he no example to leave to his successors, he further led his best men to their deaths; it will be difficult for Chín to occupy a place of authority among the states. Thus does the Gentleman know that Chín will never again march to the east.

Seldom have more foolish words been spoken. Chín soon resumed its pressure on the east. After victories over Ngwèı from 0313 to 0303, Chín joined Ngwèı, Hán, and Chí to attack non-Sinitic Chŭ in 0301, winning a major battle in 0300.

Mencius in c0310 was asked about a case in Dzōu where troops had abandoned their officers. He responded by urging benevolent government:

4:41 (MC 1B12, c0313). Dzōu and Lŭ had a skirmish. Dzōu Mù-gūng asked, Thirty-three of my officers died, and none of my subjects died in their defense. If I should execute them, there would be too many; if I should *not* execute them, I would be letting go those who looked on as their superiors died and would not save them. What should I do?

[30]He will not advertise his strength to other states, lest he attract their hostility.

[31]For the process, see Sage **Ancient**. For the strange statuary (the Sinitic states at this time had no statuary at all) and distinctive metal work of Shŭ, see Bagley **Ancient**.

[32]For the text of the poem used as evidence for this negative view, see **#8:1**.

> Mencius answered, In a bad year or a time of famine, the old and weak among milord's subjects who are rolled into ditches and canals, the strong who scatter to the four quarters, are several thousands. Milord's treasuries are full, his storehouses overflow, yet among his officers, there are none to report the situation to him. This is a case of the superiors despising and scorning their inferiors. Dzv̄ngdž said, "Take care, take care; what goes forth from you will return again to you." So if the people, now or later, have a chance to get back at them, milord should not treat it as a fault. If milord would put in practice a benevolent government, the people would come to feel at one with their superiors, and would die for their leaders.

Morale, or so Mencius wishes the world to understand, is the decisive military factor, and only his kind of governmental benevolence can create morale.

Confucian Pacifism. Just as the Micians were accepting the idea of just war, the ritualistic Analects Confucians turned *against* war. By the end of the century (#**5:77**), they refused even to *discuss* war. But the war went on.

The 03rd Century

A new Art of War appeared about this time in the central states:

> **Wú Chǐ** 吳起 or Wúdž, "Master Wú," c0295. Attributed to Wú Chǐ in the time of Ngwèı Wŭ-hóu (early 04c). A second layer (c0270) associates him with Ngwèı Wv́n-hóu (late 05c). Translated by Sawyer.

It advances the art of conquest, an art which had eluded Spring and Autumn, by telling how to take over the political infrastructure of a conquered state:

> **4:42** (Wú Chǐ 4:1, excerpt, c0295). Now, the commanding general of the Three Armies should combine both military and civilian abilities.
>
> **4:43** (Wú Chǐ 5:10, c0295). The way to attack and besiege enemy cities is this: When the walls have been breached, enter the buildings and take over all the wealth and offices; the tools and animals. Where the army encamps, do not cut down trees, destroy dwellings, take away crops, slaughter domestic animals, or burn granaries. Thus you demonstrate to the people that you have no desire to oppress them. Those who wish to surrender should be allowed to do so, and permitted to live in peace.

Again Geostrategy. Sùng, the heir of ancient Shāng, had urged its claims as an important state, and sought to have its sacrificial hymns added to the Shī. One of the hymns claimed Heavenly sanction for the Shāng (or "Yīn") empire:

> **4:44** (Shī 303, excerpt, c0320).
>
> Heaven bade the Dark Bird
> to come down and bear the Shāng
> who dwelt in the lands of Yīn so wide.

> Of old, God bade warlike Tāng
> to partition the frontier lands.
> Of those lands he was assigned to be Lord;
> Into his keeping came all realms . . .

This cultural initiative was successful (the Shāng hymns are still there, as Shī 301-305). But militarily, Sùng was weak. Chí attacked in 0286, and Sùng ceased to exist. But as with Yēn in 0314 (page 135), other states joined to expel Chí from Sùng in 0285 and went on to occupy Chí itself, driving its ruler into exile and death. Chín, by contrast, once again expanded into less culturally sensitive areas; in this case, non-Sinitic Chǔ. In 0278, Chín took the Chǔ capital Yǐng, and Chǔ moved its capital down the Yángdž River. Some territory was regained in the following year, but from this time onward, Chǔ was essentially an eastern state. This in turn drastically altered the strategic position of Ngwèı, which was now exposed on two sides to pressure from Chín.

After Sùng. The end of Sùng made a great impression. So did the fate of Chí. Responses varied. Some offered advice on a better *way* of fighting:

4:45 (DDJ 68, c0285).

> A good officer is not bellicose,
> A good warrior does not get angry;
> One good at subduing the foe does not engage,
> One skilled at using others puts himself below.
> This is called the Virtue of Not Contending . . .

Others later tried a philosophical approach, based on larger considerations:

4:46 (JZ 25:5b, excerpt, c0264). Dài Jìn-rvn said, There is something called a snail. Is the Ruler familiar with it? The Ruler replied, Yes.

There is a state on the snail's left horn, called Clash. There is a state on the snail's right horn, called Mangle. Sometimes, in contending over territory, the two go to war. The piled-up corpses number in the myriads, and they pursue the defeated for a week and a half before returning. The Ruler said, Ha! This is merely a piece of rhetoric, is it not?

Your subject begs to show the Ruler the truth of it. According to the Ruler's view, as one moves outward in the Four Directions, and up and down, is there an end? The Ruler said, There is no end.

Does he know that if he lets his mind wander in the Endless, and then with that perspective returns to the lands we know, it will be uncertain that, in comparison, those lands even exist? The Ruler said, Yes.

Among those states is Ngwèı. Within Ngwèı there is Lyáng. In Lyáng there is the King. Between the King of Lyáng and the King of Mangle, is there a difference? The Ruler said, There is no difference.

The visitor then went out, but the Ruler kept on sitting there, uncertainly, as though he had forgotten something.

He had forgotten *himself*. Or more exactly, his former idea of himself.

Spying. As the military manuals came to be widely read, and generals on all sides came to know the same things, the former tactical edge vanished. One way to regain the initiative was to know in advance what the enemy would do. The proprietors of the Sūndž thus added a chapter to their work, which gave sophisticated advice on getting, and also on planting, military information:

> **4:47** (Sūndž 13, excerpts, c0262) . . . One who confronts his enemy for years in order to strive for victory in a decisive battle, yet who because he grudges rank, honor, and a few hundred pieces of gold, remains ignorant of his enemy's situation, is devoid of humanity . . . The reason the wise prince and able general conquer wherever they go . . . is foreknowledge. Foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits or gods, or by analogy with past events, or from calculations. It must be obtained from men who know the enemy situation. There are five types of secret agents to be employed: the local, the inside, the double, the expendable, and the living . . .

Note the emphasis on humanity: an intelligence war produces fewer casualties.

The Chín theorists defended war by analogy from legal punishments:

> **4:48** (SJS 18:1, excerpt, c0256). If by war one would abolish war, then even though it *is* war, it is permissible. If by killing one would abolish killing, then even though it *is* killing, it is permissible. If by punishment one would abolish punishments, then even if they are severe punishments, they are permissible . . .

The text admits the people's dislike of fighting, but only to advise how it may be overcome. Family pressure is one way; local control is another:

> **4:49** (SJS 18:2b, excerpt, c0256). War is what the people hate, but he who can make the people delight in war will become King. With the people of a strong state, a father seeing off his son, or an elder brother his younger brother, or a wife her husband, will all say, If you are not successful, do not return. They will also say, If you die through breaking the law or disobeying orders, we too will die. If the villages are orderly, deserters will have no place to hide, and stragglers no place to go . . .

All earlier efforts against the war machine having proved unavailing, the late Mencians turned to pure invective. They pilloried Lyáng Hwèı-wáng, whose own son had fallen in battle, as a monstrous butcher:

> **4:50** (MC 7B1, c0255). Mencius said, Unbenevolent was King Hwèı of Lyáng! The benevolent extend from those they love to those they don't. The unbenevolent extend from those they don't love to those they do.
>
> Gūngsūn Chŏu asked, What do you mean?
>
> King Hwèı of Lyáng for the sake of territory made pulp of his people, sending them to war. Suffering a major defeat, and being about to resume but fearing he might not win, he drove the youth he loved to his death. That is what is meant by "from those they don't love to those they do."

This inversion of the Mician idea of extrapolating from love of kin to love of all men (**#4:4**) abandons persuasion for abuse. At least it is effective abuse.

Militarization of the intellectual sphere continued in the 03c. It is perhaps saddest to observe in the Micians, who had been the most organized, and the most articulate, of the antiwar thinkers. But the need to talk the language of those around them affected the Micians, as it must affect any advocacy group. Of their last ethical essays, this one shows the process especially clearly:

> **4:51** (MZ 5, excerpt, c0263). Our Master Mwòdž said, A state has seven disasters. What are the seven disasters? When the walls and moat cannot be guarded but palaces and chambers are in order: this is the first disaster. When an adjacent state comes to the border but no neighbor state comes to our aid: this is the second disaster. When first they exhaust the people's strength on useless projects and reward incapable people; when the people's strength is exhausted in trivialities and rewards are wasted on visitors: this is the third disaster. When officials protect their salaries and travelers are received with affection; when the ruler creates laws to punish the officials and the officials are in fear and dare not resist: this is the fourth disaster. When a ruler thinks himself wise and does not inquire into affairs, when he thinks himself safe and does not make preparations; when the neighbor states plot against him and he does not know enough to take measures: this is the fifth disaster. When those who are trusted are disloyal and when the loyal are not trusted: this is the sixth disaster. When stored and planted grain is not enough for consumption; when the high officials are not sufficient to manage; when rewards do not give happiness and punishments to not inspire awe: this is the seventh disaster.
>
> If these seven disasters exist in a state, there will be no altars of soil and grain; if with these seven disasters one tries to guard the wall, the foe will arrive and the state will fall. When the seven disasters obtain, the state will surely meet with disaster.

Military, economic, and organizational shortcomings are magnified in severity if they exist in a context of general war. Of the primary Mician tenets, universal love is gone, opposition to war is gone: war is here whether we like it or not. Only frugality is left, and frugality is important only as a way to avoid defeat.

Syẃndž had become the governor of much of the old Lŭ and Sùng territory in 0254. In 0250 he took part in a Chŭ military mission to Jàu. In those discussions, he thus characterized the quality of Chín's armies:

> **4:52** (SZ 15:1d, excerpt, c0250) . . . The use of the people in obligatory services is stern and harsh. They are coerced with authority, restricted to a narrow life by deprivation, urged on with incentives and rewards, and intimidated with punishments and penalties. Those in subordinate and humble positions are made to understand that only by success in combat can they hope for benefits from their superiors. Men must endure deprivation before they are employed, and some accomplishment must be achieved before any benefits are obtained, but as the accomplishments increase, so do the rewards. Accordingly, a man who takes the heads of five enemy soldiers has five households assigned to him.

> Because of this policy, soldiers have become exceedingly numerous, the fighting strength of the army is very formidable, its ability to remain in the field has been much prolonged, and Chín's taxable territories have been greatly extended. That there have been four consecutive generations of victories is due, not to mere chance or luck, but to calculation . . .

Syẃndž also notes the fears of Chín:

> **4:53** (SZ 15:3, excerpt, c0250) . . . Chín for four generations has had only victories, but it has always been apprehensive lest the world should unite to oppose it . . .

Efforts *were* being made at this time to form an anti-Chín alliance; the First Emperor of Chín would later refer to them.[33] Exactly what the efforts were is buried under a Hàn literature of wishful thinking.[34] They failed due to the eastern states' fear of each other, as is shown by the alliances that crushed Chí in 0314 and in 0285: they would only unite to prevent one of their number from dominating the rest. A permanent union of these states could have reached military equilibrium with Chín, but the popular loyalties on which the strength of these states rested, and their own separate agendas, precluded that outcome.[35] Victory would go to the strongest single state.

The End of Lǔ. For a while, it seemed that the strongest one might be Chǔ. Chǔ had cautiously annexed the southern part of Lǔ and Sùng in 0255/54, without provoking reprisals from any other states, and installed Syẃndž as its governor. In 0249, it completed the task by annexing the northern part, bringing to an end the sovereignty of Lǔ, as well as the local Confucian and Mician schools. The Micians in Lǔ seem to have seen this coming. In the last of their writings, they let Mwòdž write the epitaph of the Mician movement as the defenders of cities. They had failed, and even their memory was fading:

> **4:54** (MZ 50, c0250). Gūngshū Pán had completed some cloud-ladders for Chǔ, and was preparing to attack Sùng with them. Master Mwòdž heard about it, and starting from Chí, he traveled for ten days and ten nights until he reached Yǐng. There he had an audience with Gūngshū Pán. Gūngshū Pán said, What instruction has the Master for me? Master Mwòdž said, In the north there is someone who has insulted your subject. I should like to arrange for you to kill him. Gūngshū Pán was not pleased. Master Mwòdž said, I ask permission to present ten pieces of gold. Gūngshū Pán said, My principles are firmly against killing. Master Mwòdž rose, bowed twice, and said, I beg leave to explain.

[33]For the Chín Emperor's inscriptions see #**8:9**, and even more forcefully #**8:28**.

[34]Massively preserved in the diplomatic stories of the Jàn-gwó Tsv̀ (below, p116).

[35]For the equally forlorn notion of a political union of Britain and France against a stronger enemy in 1940, see Churchill **Finest** 204f.

In the north, I heard you were making ladders and preparing to attack Sùng. What offense has Sùng committed? The Land of Jīng[36] has an excess of land, but not enough people. To kill what you have not enough of in order to contend for what you have an excess of cannot be said to be wise. To attack Sùng when it has committed no offense cannot be said to be benevolent. To know this, but not to contest [the Chǔ plan] cannot be said to be loyal. To contest it but not to succeed cannot be said to be forceful. To refuse to kill few out of principle, but yet to be ready to kill many, cannot be said to show a sense of proportion.

Gūngshū Pán said, Agreed. Master Mwòdž said, Then why not desist? Gūngshū Pán said, It cannot be done; I have already spoken of it with the King. Master Mwòdž said, Why not present me to the King? Gūngshū Pán said, Very well.

Master Mwódž saw the King, and said, Suppose someone were to discard his own decorated carriage, but his neighbor has a shabby cart, and he wants to steal it? Suppose he were to discard his own embroidered robe, but his neighbor has a short jacket and he wants to steal it? Suppose he were to discard his own fine meat, but his neighbor has some chaff, and he wants to steal it? What kind of man would that be? The King said, he would have to be a kleptomaniac.

Master Mwòdž said, The territory of Jīng is 5000 square leagues in extent; the territory of Sùng is 500 square leagues in extent. This is like the decorated carriage and the shabby cart. Jīng has its Yźwn-mvèng Park, which is full of rhinoceros and deer, and the fish and turtles, the gars and gators, in the Jyāng and Hàn rivers are the most plentiful in the world; Sùng is said to possess not even pheasants or rabbits; foxes or badgers. This is like the meat and the chaff. Jīng possesses tall pines, figured catalpas, pin oaks and cedars, camphor trees; Sùng has no tall timber. This is like the embroidered robe and the short jacket. Your subject, on comparing these three things to the plans of the King's servants to attack Sùng, finds that there may be a similarity.

The King said, Excellent. But all the same, Gūngshū Pán has made the cloud ladders for me, and I am determined to take Sùng. Thereupon he received Gūngshū Pán. Master Mwòdž took off his sash to represent the city wall, and used small sticks to represent the various weapons. Gūngshū Pán deployed his weapons in nine attacks on Sùng, and Master Mwòdž nine times countered them. Gūngshū Pán's devices of attack were exhausted, while Master Mwòdž still had defensive stratagems to spare.

Gūngshū Pán was embarrassed, but said, I know how I can refute you, but I won't tell. Master Mwòdž said, I know how you can refute me, but I won't tell. The King of Chǔ asked what it was.

[36]This archaic variant is evidently more courtly than the common name "Chǔ."

> Master Mwòdž said, Master Gūngshū's idea is to kill me, and when he has killed me, he thinks there will be no one to defend Sùng, so it can be attacked. But your servant's disciple Chín Gǔ-lí and three hundred others are manning the defenses for me, and atop the walls of Sùng they await the bandits from Chǔ. Though you kill your servant, you cannot avoid them. The King of Chǔ said, Excellent. I beg permission not to attack Sùng.
>
> Master Mwòdž passed through Sùng on his return. It was raining, and he wanted to take shelter in the gateway, but the gate warden would not admit him. Thus it is said, Those who create order in secret, the multitude do not know of their achievements. Those who make war in the open, the multitude know all about.

And in that year, 0249, the Sùng lands which had been invaded in 0286 by Chí were after all added to the territory of Chǔ. Chǔ would not keep them long.

Chí thought it might still have a chance. A new Chí military treatise . . .

> **Sīmǎ Fǎ 司馬法** (SMF), "The Marshal's Art of War," c0248. Written in Chí. Despite a Confucian coloring, it is in places more draconic than its predecessors, the Sūndž and the Wú Chǐ. Translated by Sawyer.

. . . argued, with SJS (#**4:48**), that war is waged for the purpose of *ending* war:

> **4:55** (Sīmǎ Fǎ 1, excerpt, c0248). Authority comes from war and not from men. For this reason, if one must kill men to give peace to the people, then killing is permissible . . . If one can only stop war with war, then even if it is war, it is permissible.

The Lǚ-shì Chūn/Chyōu also accepted war, in terms taken from the Sīmǎ Fǎ:

> **4:56** (LSCC 7/2:4, excerpt, 0241). Weapons are truly justified when they are used to punish cruel rulers and free their suffering people . . .
>
> **4:57** (LSCC 8/2:4, excerpt, c0241). One uses a tool of ill omen when one cannot help it . . . One kills some to allow others to live . . .

Heaven permits, and indeed requires, ruthlessness toward one's own people.

The chariot warriors' ethos of prowess and personal loyalty was obsolete in the new age of mass warfare, but it lived on in a tradition of elite vengeance. The archetype of vengeance stories is that of the desperado Yǜ Ràng **豫讓**, set in the epic days of the tripartition of Jìn (page 65). Excerpts survive in the core LSCC (0241); the whole story is preserved in a Hàn-dynasty collection:

> **Jàn-gwó Tsè 戰國策** (JGT). A collection of 497 tales from the personal exploit and (especially) the diplomatic intrigue literature of early Hàn. Edited by Lyóu Syàng in c022. Translated by Crump.

The Yǜ Ràng tale is not so much about Yǜ Ràng as about the ideal of honor.

The tale begins:

> **4:58** (JGT #232, excerpt, c0245). Yẁ Ràng, the grandson of Bì Yáng of Jìn, first served the Fàn and Jūng-háng clans, but was unhappy. He left them and went to the Lord of Jī̀, and the Lord of Jī̀ showed him favor. When the Three Jìn states divided the territory of the Lord of Jī̀, Jàu Syāngdž hated the Lord of Jī̀ more than the others, and made his skull into a drinking vessel. Yẁ Ràng fled to the mountains, and said, Alas! A knight will die for one who knows his worth; a maid will beautify herself for one who loves her. I will repay the insult to the Jī̀ clan.
>
> He changed his surname and name, became a [mutilated] convict, and entered the palace on the pretext of plastering the privy, intending to assassinate Syāngdž. Syāngdž went to the privy, but he grew suspicious. He held and questioned the plasterer. It was Yẁ Ràng, who had sharpened the edge of his trowel into a blade; he said, I wished to repay the insult shown to the Lord of Jī̀. The attendants wished to kill him, but Syāngdž said, He is a man of honor 義; I will merely take care to avoid him. The Lord of Jī̀ is dead, and has left no posterity behind him, but this, his subject, goes to such lengths to avenge the insult to him. This is one of the worthiest men in the world. In the end, he released him.
>
> Yẁ Ràng lacquered his body until it was ulcerated, shaved his hair and removed his eyebrows, and scarred himself to change his appearance. Disguising himself as a beggar he went forth to beg. His wife did not recognize him, and said, His appearance is not like that of my husband, yet how comes his voice to be so much like that of my husband? He then swallowed ashes to make himself hoarse, changing his voice . . .

And here is the end. Yẁ Ràng is caught in a later attempt to kill Syāngdž, but is allowed to fulfill his obligation symbolically by being given Syāngdž's cloak:

> **4:59** (JGT #232, excerpt, c0245). Yẁ Ràng drew his sword and thrice leaped up, shouting to Heaven as he struck at the cloak, Thus do I avenge the Lord of Jī̀. He then fell on his sword and died. And the day he died, when the knights of Jàu heard of it, they all shed tears for him.

Thus met in unequal combat the personal valor and honor of the old society and the collective loyalty and obedience of the new.

Chín now entered the escalation race in military theory. As it had done in the past, it turned to Ngwèı, and invited to Chín a Ngwèı military expert, who there extended his military manual, originally written to replace the Wú Chǐ:

> **Wèı Lyáudž** 尉繚子 (WLZ). A first stage (WLZ 1-10, c0238) was written in Ngwèı; the rest (WLZ 11-24, c0232) in Chín. The focus is organizational. The standard Confucian virtue words are mixed with notably ruthless advice for the conduct of war. Translated by Sawyer.

The Ngwèı part of this work already shows the iron discipline which was replacing the personal valor of Yẁ Ràng.

Here, as a pendant to Yẁ-ràng, is an emblematic story of the late 03c army:

> **4:60** (WLZ 8, excerpt, c0238). When Wú Chǐ fought with Chín, and before battle was joined, one man, unable to contain his ardor, went forward, took two heads, and returned. Wú Chǐ at once ordered him to be beheaded. The commander protested, This is a talented officer; he should not be beheaded. Wú Chǐ said, A talented officer he may be, but he opposed my orders. And he had him beheaded.

In Chín, this sort of discipline was systematically extended to the whole army, with rules about who, on the field of battle, could execute whom. Here are hints about how the desperate valor of Chín soldiers was produced:

> **4:61** (WLZ 14, 伍制令 "Orders for the Group," excerpt, c0232). Organization in the army: Five men are a group 伍; the group are mutually responsible. Ten men are a section 什; the section are mutually responsible. Fifty men are a team 屬; the team are mutually responsible. A hundred men are a company 閭; the company are mutually responsible.
>
> If someone in the group resists an order or violates a prohibition, and others report it, they will be absolved of blame. If they know of it but do not report it, the entire group will be executed. If someone in the section resists an order or violates a prohibition . . .
>
> **4:62** (WLZ 16, 束伍令 "Orders For Groups," excerpt, c0232). Orders concerning groups are: Five men make a group, and together they receive orders from the staff of the general. If they lose a group but get a group, it cancels out. If they get a group without loss, they are rewarded. If they lose a group without getting a group, they will die and their families will be extirpated.
>
> If they lose their leader 長 but get a leader, it cancels out . . .
>
> The rule for battlefield executions: The leader of a section 什 can execute the section. The leader of a platoon 伯 can execute the leader of a section. The general of a thousand can execute the leader of a hundred. The general 將 of a myriad can execute the general of a thousand. The Left and Right Generals of the Army 左右將軍 can execute the general of a myriad. The Generalissimo 大將軍 has no one he cannot execute.

Methodological Moment. These are the four classical military texts. Suppose their order is known to be Sūndž, Wú Chǐ, Sžmă Fă, Wèı Lyáudž. There is a joint concordance to all four. What are the relations among them?

In the concordance (it is not necessary to know Chinese) we find sentences that recur in two or more of these texts. Such overlap occurs between Sūndž and Sžmă Fă on the one hand, and Sūndž, Wú Chǐ, and Wèı Lyáudž on the other. Sūndž being the oldest, it seems to have led to two later developments: (1) in Chí, the Sžmă Fă; and (2) in Ngwèı, the Wú Chǐ and the first half of Wèı Lyáudž, with the rest of the Wèı Lyáudž being written in Chín. It is then probable that there were not one but *two* sequences of military texts.

Defense. Offensive war hardened, and so did its defensive counterpart. Gates were covered, first with mud and later with metal, against fire arrows. Trenches outside the gates with a suspended bridge allowed only one person at a time to enter. At intervals along the walls were shields, fire screens, and crossbows to direct fire at enemy battering rams or movable observation and attack towers. These last were called "cloud ladders" (**#4:54**) because they did not need a wall, they were propped, as it were, against the sky.

On the attack side, here is how a mid 03c Chín city assault was organized, and how stringently it was encouraged to succeed:

> **4:63** (SJS 19, excerpt, c0256). In attacking or besieging a town, the Minister of Public Works examines and estimates the size and resources of the city. The military officials assign places, dividing the area according to the number of soldiers and officers available for the attack, and sets them a timetable . . .They dig out subterranean passages and pile up fuel, then set fire to the beams . . . For every man [of the enemy] killed, remission of taxes is granted, but for every man who cannot fight to the death, ten are torn to pieces by the chariots. Those who make critical remarks are branded or their noses are sliced off beneath the city wall.

But the Micians soon found countermoves. From the defending side, poison gas was piped into the attackers' tunnels. Houses were razed to contain fire attacks. The surrounding land was devastated to deny its use to the attacker:

> **4:64** (MZ 70:38, excerpt, c0242). For one hundred leagues beyond the outer wall, cut down and remove all walls, both high and low, and plants and trees both large and small. Fill in all the empty wells, so that water cannot be drawn from them. Outside, destroy all the empty buildings and chop down all the trees. Take into the city everything that could be used in attacking the city . . .

There was provision for medical leave, but also a procedure to detect fraud:

> **4:65** (MZ 70:25, excerpt, c0242). Let the wounded return home to heal their wound and be cared for. Provide a doctor who will give medicines . . . Have an officer go regularly to the village to see if the wound has healed . . . In the case of those who falsely wound themselves to avoid service, put the whole family to death.

And any sign of disaffection, or failure of morale, was brutally punished:

> **4:66** (MZ 70:11, excerpt, c0242). Extra prohibitions for a besieged city. When the enemy arrives unexpectedly, strictly order officers and people not to dare to make disturbances, gather in threes, go about together, look at each other, sit down and weep, raise their hands to touch each other, point to each other, call to each other, signal to each other . . . [Such persons] are to be executed. If the other members of the squads 伍 do not apprehend them, they too are to be executed; if they do apprehend them, they are to be pardoned . . .

Officer and citizen alike are subject to the group responsibility rule.

And thus it came about that in skill and resource, in discipline and ferocity, the attackers and the defenders in the end became virtually indistinguishable. Did it really matter, any longer, who won?

Offense. In the late 04c, the Sūndž had praised the general who preserved a conquered army to add it to his own force. This policy of appeasement and reuse (in effect, conciliating the conquered populace) was developed in the early 03c by the Wú Chǐ's emphasis on taking over intact the administrative and civil structures of the conquered states (**#4:43**). But as the wars went on, Chín preferred to devastate conquered cities and massacre surrendered armies (the Jàu soldiers who thus perished at Cháng-píng in 0260 numbered 400,000). This retaliation against resistance to Chín seems to have assisted, not retarded, the progress of Chín to final victory.

Nor did Chín spare its own resources. As the human cost of warfare rose, Chin proved willing to pay that cost. As supporting witness to SJS 19 (**#4:63**), here is a passage on generalship from the Chín portion of the Wèı Lyáudž:

> **4:67** (WLZ 24, excerpt, c0232). I have heard that in antiquity, those who excelled in using their troops could bear to kill half their officers and men. The next best could kill 30 percent, and the lowest, 10 percent. The awesomeness of one who could sacrifice half his troops affected all within the Four Seas . . . Thus I say that a mass of a hundred thousand that does not follow orders is not as good as ten thousand men who fight, and ten thousand men who fight are not as good as a hundred men who are truly aroused.

And Chín, in a passage already quoted, continued to hammer at its root idea: a state at war has room for nothing but farming and fighting:

> **4:68** (SJS 25:3, excerpt, c0236). And so my teaching is that if the people want profit, they cannot get it but by farming; if they want to avoid harm, they cannot do so but by fighting. If none of the people of the state but first engage in farming and fighting, then later they will get what they like. Thus, though the territory be small, the production will be large; though the populace be sparse, the army will be strong. If one can carry out these two principles in his own territory, then the Way of the Hegemon King lies open before him.

It did indeed. At that moment, seven states were still in contention. Hán was defeated in 0230 by a Chín army led by "Palace Official Tźng;" Chín generals Wáng Jyěn 王翦 and Wáng Bīn 王賁 were prominent in what followed. Jàu was destroyed in 0228; some Jàu forces escaped to Yēn. Ngwèı fell in 0225 and Chǔ in 0224. A Chǔ remnant under Syàng Yēn regrouped south of the Hwáı River; they were wiped out in 0223. Yēn, with its Jàu refugees, fell in 0222. Chí surrendered without a battle in 0221.

The Six States were no more, and all the world belonged to Chín.