

Appendix 5

A Reading of LY 1–4 in Text Order

Analects 1–4 are here presented, not in their historical order, but in the order that they have in the text in its presumed final form, which we conclude it had reached as of the Chū conquest of 0249, and which it still has in all later versions. Besides reverting to this sequence, we have also restored the interpolated passages which in the main translation were relocated to their approximate chronological position. These four chapters are thus presented here in the sequence in which latter-day readers have always encountered them.

Putting the preposed chapters LY 1–3 *in initial position* before LY 4 makes it possible for readers familiar with the order of the present text to consult those chapters in their familiar places; in that sense, this Appendix serves as a supplement of convenience to the main translation, where only from LY 4 onward do the order of chapter composition and that of chapter sequence coincide. The agreement with the standard text is made yet greater by the presence of the restored interpolations.

What one discovers on thus rearranging the text is that changing the sequence of the text *also significantly changes its meaning*. The principal effect of the change is to give the entire Analects the character of the three preposed chapters, making this originally eccentric material (LY 1, especially, is from an atypical period of disengagement from contemporary politics) decisive in establishing a context for the study and appreciation of the work. Thus, in contrast to the Original Analects which the present book has attempted to rediscover, this Appendix presents a sample of the Final Analects. The versions of LY 1–4 passages given here are therefore not simply repeated from the main translation, but are *different from them* at points where the rearrangement either obscures the original sense or imposes a new one. In addition to its convenience value, this Appendix offers the reader an opportunity to see in detail how the meaning of the earlier parts of the text *at the time they were written* was obscured and uniformized in its final preposed and interpolated form.

The Principal Changes

The first thing that preposing LY 1–3 accomplishes is to emphasize their contents *by having the reader encounter them first*, without any precedents or antecedents, so that they form the reader's first impression of Confucius's teachings, and establish a framework of understanding for everything that follows. The mixing of text strata also blurs the evolutionary aspect of the text. The tension between the feudal value "rǔn" and the technician's value "knowledge" vanishes, as does the contrast between the empirical Confucius of LY 4 and the cultural transmitter Confucius of LY 7 and later. These and other developmental differences certainly persist in the work in its mixed-strata form, but when noticed at all, they tend to be reduced by readers to their *historically latest terms*.

Second, the presence of the interpolated passages formally interrupts and obscures the original pattern of paired sayings (which in any case was already weak in some chapters), thus disabling the pairing principle as a factor in interpretation. Except for a few striking instances which commentators have always recognized, this all but *eliminates the microcontexts* and strengthens the uniformizing tendency by releasing the local saying into the context of the entire work.

Third is the loss of chapter *sections*, which like the pairing pattern were already weakly distinguished in some cases, and were further compromised over the life of the text by the addition of interpolations. These interpolations, as we have shown above, were not placed at random, but were inserted at carefully chosen points, to update an early idea by juxtaposing a later form of that idea. This artfulness gives the interpolations an effect even greater than their very considerable number (27% of the text) might suggest. The interpolations did not by any means always achieve their intended purpose for all readers, as the scholarly dispute over the outrageous LY 9:1 illustrates. But on the whole, they did succeed in reducing the perceived historical differences between chapters, and the suggestive original clusterings within chapters, thus largely neutralizing their interpretative importance.

In consequence, the dates assigned to chapters in the main translation do not appear here, the presumption of post-Hàn readers being that all the material is more or less *from*, or, if parts of it are scribally later, still more or less accurately *reflects*, the lifetime of Confucius. This is the fourth difference.

Fifth and last, in the Final Analects there are not perceived to be significant differences between the *authors* of different chapters. That the chapters are *different* no one has ever denied, but once these differences are seen as reflecting only the different limitations of the several original disciples, as all the Hàn and later commentaries assume, they lose analytical interest in a tradition whose sole focus is the Confucius persona. Author names are thus not mentioned in what follows. Confucianism speaks with one voice.

Cautionary Marks

As a warning to readers of convenience, and a guideline to others, the points where the wording of the translation has been changed to fit the new context, or where the old wording has a different impact because of that context, are indicated by **boldface** type. The nature of the difference is explained in the commentary.

Envoi

It would be undersanguine to close with the thought that the changes here discussed irretrievably obscured the original thought and character of Confucius. That character, in part enigmatic as it must always remain, somehow survives as a stalwart dedication, a generous anger, that percolates through the larger mass of the later Analects. We feel in the Analects, as we do not in the partly contemporary Gwändž, for example, the enduring presence of a forceful personality.

Nor, philosophically, need the blending of the Final Analects be seen as a loss. We have been at pains to show, in the main commentary, how the successors of Confucius broke new and valuable ground in adjusting their inheritance to the changing needs of postfeudal society; in the process making it of far more than antiquarian interest for other postfeudal societies. The sentimental reader may deplore the diluting of the original historical Confucius; the practical reader will instead welcome the nourishing of an ongoing Confucianism. The question is whether the text as finally configured, with its structural pressure from precisely the atypical, preposed chapters, does sufficient justice to this Final Confucianism. On that point, not to anticipate the results of the small experiment in practical reading which follows, it seems to us that there are plentiful reasons for concern, but also nontrivial grounds for hope.

1

This is the page at which the present-day reader opens the Analects, and these are thus the sayings which define the context of all that follows.

The numbering of passages is identical in the Legge text.

1:1. The Master said, To learn and in due time rehearse it: is this not **indeed** pleasurable? To have friends coming from far places: is this not **indeed** delightful? If others do not recognize him, but he is not disheartened, is he not **indeed** a gentleman?

The repeated yì 亦, originally “also,” are here merely exclamatory (“indeed”); 1:1 is the first saying in the book, and there is nothing with which “also” can contrast. Thus, an *alternate* road to virtue (memorizing texts) has become the *only* road. In our own century, the academic tone of 1:1 has made its first line a favorite for scholarly conference participants to quote to each other.

1:2. Yǒudǔ said, One whose deportment is filial and fraternal but loves to oppose his superiors, is rare. One who does not love to oppose his superiors but does love to foment disorder, has never existed. The gentleman works on the basis; when the basis is set, then the Way comes to exist. Filiality and fraternity are the basis of rǎn, are they not?

We first encounter rǎn as underlaid by domestic and hierarchical virtues (respect toward fathers and elder brothers), and itself the basis of public order. A filial citizenry is one schooled in docility, the Way at which 1:2 aims.

1:3. The Master said, Artful words and an impressive appearance: seldom are they rǎn.

Whatever rǎn is, it is incompatible with artifice and insubstantiality.

1:4. Dǎngdǎng said, I daily examine myself in three ways: in planning on behalf of **others**, have I been disloyal? In associating with friends, have I been unfaithful? What has been transmitted to me, have I not rehearsed?

This anxious self-concern becomes our model for personal duty. The domestic limitation on “others” in the original 1:4 is for some readers skewed back into the public-service area by the interpolated 1:5, below; see however 1:6n.

1:5. The Master said, To lead a state of a thousand chariots, be assiduous in administration and keep faith; make expenditures frugally and be solicitous of others; and employ the people according to the season.

This rulership interpolation now helps offset the domestic focus of LY 1.

1:6. The Master said, A student when at home should be filial, when away from home should be fraternal. He should be circumspect but faithful, should love all the multitude but be intimate only with the rǎn. If after doing this he has any strength left over, then he can use that to study culture.

“Fraternal” weakens the public meaning of “away from home” (Huang glosses it as “at school”), and reinforces the domestic sense of the first line of 1:4.

1:7. Dž-syà said, He sees the worthy as worthy; he makes light of beauty. If in serving father and mother he can exhaust his strength; if in serving his ruler he can bring all his faculties to bear; if in associating with friends he always keeps his word – though one might say that has not “studied,” I would certainly call him a scholar.

This more public original saying in turn aids 1:5 against 1:6. It also helps, as it originally did, to dilute the book-learning focus established in 1:1.

1:8. The Master said, If he is not solid he will not be held in awe; if he studies, he will not be rigid. Let him put first loyalty and fidelity, let him not make friends of those who are not at the same level as himself, and if he makes a mistake, then let him not be afraid to **change**.

The “it” of the original “change *it*” was in the contraction *vùt* 勿. But the preposed-object rule no longer held in Hàn, and *vùt* was seen as a mere variant of the basic negative “do not.” Rather than correcting the *error*, the reader was thus instructed to correct the *self*, as in the self-perfection theory of 1:2. This is how Sei Shōnagon understood the passage; see the main translation at 1:8n.

1:9. Dzṽngdž said, When concern for the departed continues until they are far away, the virtue of the people will have become substantial.

The emphasis on the funerary side of domestic piety, linking up with the filial image which Dzṽngdž presents in Hàn and later legend.

1:10. Dž-chín asked Dž-gùng, When our respected Master arrives in some country, he always manages to hear about its government. Does he seek this, or does he wait until they give it to him? Dž-gùng said, Our Respected Master is warm, genial, respectful, restrained, and deferential; in this way he gets it. Our Respected Master’s “seeking” is perhaps different from other people’s seeking, is it not?

He invites it rather than directly asking it. This diplomatic saying would seem to reinforce the public aspect of the chapter, but late school tradition (Huang refers to “Six Classics”) sees an ultimately scholastic focus even here.

1:11. The Master said, When his father is living, watch his intentions; when his father is deceased, watch his actions. If for three years he has not changed from the ways of his father, he can be called filial.

This uses the the three-year mourning as a touchstone for inferring character. The trait here prized is a willing inner subordination to the father’s authority.

1:12. Yōudž said, In the practice of ritual, harmony is to be esteemed. The Way of the Former Kings was beautiful in this: in small things and great they followed it. If there is something that does not go right, one should recognize the principle of harmony, and then it will become harmonious. But if it is not moderated by ritual itself, it still won’t go right.

This piece of ritual theory was inserted between 1:11 (on mourning) and 1:13 (where the speaker is Yōudž), giving a seemingly consecutive group of three sayings. It recommends concord as a guiding principle, but notes that this flexibility must be guided by a sense of ritual propriety. The ultimate concord is thus not with circumstances, but with the ritual intent. Compare 2:5, below.

1:13. Yǒudǔ said, If his promises are close to what is right, his word can be relied on. If his respect is close to propriety, he will avoid shame and disgrace. If he marries one who has not wronged her own kin, she can be part of his clan.

These office and family guidelines are given extra depth by the preceding 1:12 statement of a general ritual principle underlying ordinary human affairs. It is this deeply sacramental view of human life, seen not as a particular stage in the development of Confucianism but as suffusing all of Confucianism from its inception (a perception which the sequence 1:11–13 aims precisely to evoke), that is developed in Fingarette **Sacred**.

1:14. The Master said, If a gentleman in his eating does not seek to be filled and in his dwelling does not seek comfort, if he is assiduous in deed and cautious in word, if he associates with those who possess the Way and is corrected by them, he can be said to love learning.

The general air of personal restraint in this passage raises no problems either with the original chapter or with its highlighted and augmented new message.

1:15. Dǔ-gùng said, “Poor but does not flatter, rich but does not sneer” – how would that do? The Master said, It would do. But it is not as good as “Poor but happy, rich but loving propriety.” Dǔ-gùng said, The Poem says, “As though cut, as though ground, as though smoothed, as though polished” – is this what it means? The Master said, Sǐ can at last be talked with about the Poetry: I tell him things in terms of the past, and he knows what is to come.

Further praise of the restrained temperament, with the original “propriety” here liable to interpretation in the stronger sense “ritual propriety” and thus smoothly accepting the impetus given to the whole chapter in 1:12, and giving it in turn the further authority of the now more widely accepted classic Shī.

1:16. The Master said, He does not worry that others do not know him; he worries that he does not know others.

This saying now anticipates, and in the consecutive reader’s mind replaces, the prototype 4:14 and its sequels. In 4:14 the paired clauses are both based on verbal puns: wèi 位 “position” and lì 立 “stand,” and jī 知 “recognize” in both its active and passive moods. Even as altered from the sonorous and courtly prototype 4:14 (and its largely compatible later sequels *14:30^{5a} and *15:19^{5a}), this saying preserves something of a classic 05c sense of duty, involving the redirection of resentment into more useful channels, but the elimination of the public political ambience that characterized 4:14 and its successors is still vital. The force of 1:16 is social rather than solipsistic, but the society within which it will be imagined as operating hardly exceeds that implied in the keystone saying 1:1 – a group of like-minded individuals, bent on improving themselves, and qualifying as gentlemen precisely by their lack of resentment (one might almost say lack of concern) toward the outer political world. That is, the old, vertical-ethic saying has here become lateralized. It is a stage in the evolution toward the later, also interpolated *6:30¹⁸, which spells out in detail how reciprocal concern for others is supposed to work. We are in the altruist world of DDJ 49 (compare LY *14:34¹⁷) and DDJ 63.

In retrospect, we may see that 1:16 was probably fashioned as an intentional echo and reinforcement of 1:1, further emphasizing its keynote function.

Chapter Comment

Though for purposes of this Appendix all Analects sayings form a single mutual context, the chapter divisions are still there, and it is natural to ask, of LY 1, what central principle it implies. The answer might be that it is the ritual concept of appropriateness; the secular ǐ 禮 (see the note to 1:13) which probably derived from the literal sacrificial ǐ expertise developed in the 04c Confucian school. The original sacramental sense of ǐ is also alive in the chapter, as is the tissue of hierarchical and predetermined relationships which occur in both court and family life. What the historical reader will see as interpolations in LY 1 (from a later decade, when the Lǔ Confucians were again in service) help give the scriptural reader a sense of government as an ultimate goal, but on balance that goal seems more remote than the more vividly realized personal context. It looms at a distance, dignifying but not defining the ideal individual which the chapter describes.

What of the mysterious virtue rǎn 仁? If we base ourselves only on LY 1 as we here have it, the relevant material is 1:2 (where filial and fraternal behavior are its basis), 1:3 (where the artful and imposing are said to rarely have it), and 1:6 (where intimacy is reserved for those who possess it). This fits the domestic and hierarchical character of the chapter, and there most readers will leave it.

A more patient reader can get a little more out of it. First we have 1:2, which can be seen as saying that rǎn is at a higher level than the filiality and fraternity on which it rests. Rǎn is a way of interaction with those to whom one's relationship is not fixed by family ties: it is family writ large but *not the same* as family. 1:6 then tells us that rǎn is not writ all that large: it is indeed a basis for association outside of kinship groups, but only with a select few. The rest of humanity one loves, but keeps a certain distance from. This realistic precept avoids the Mician inclusive tone of 12:22, where rǎn is simply the love of others. Rǎn in LY 1 is not a given, in relations beyond the family; it must be recognized in individuals; this adds a nonpredetermined note. We learn in 1:3 that rǎn is incompatible with artifice: it has a quality of integrity. And 1:16, without mentioning rǎn directly, suggests that right behavior is not merely a possession, which one has and then waits to be rewarded for having; it is a cause of action. One gives the world, or a susceptible part of the world, what one hopes to get from it. Expectation creates a balancing obligation.

A reader may object that this is not Confucius's rǎn. But does it matter? Confucius rightly enjoys credit for having set the enterprise in motion; credit for where it goes, or what it may be worth when it gets there, belongs to others. The thinkers (and interpolaters) of LY 1 inhabited a less feudal, less preset world than Confucius; they were, like ourselves, coping with a society in which virtue, if it exists at all, is voluntary. They may have much to say to us.

So much for analyzing gnomic sayings. Readers may find it tedious. The Analects itself tends to abandon the pithy style for something more extended. And yet the gnomic style has its place: there are things in life that cannot be expressed at length (Vreeland **D. V.** 97; two words that transformed a situation) or taught consecutively, but are better apprehended in concentrated bursts of attention. Hazlitt **Genius** 108–109 held that genius is unaware of its powers; this is wrong of genius, but it is right of virtue (JZ 20:9; Watson **Chuang** 220). Too much attention, including too much self-attention, spoils it.

2

LY 2, we must remember, does not have a date of its own in the Analects when the Analects is seen as an integral work; it is simply the next chapter. There is no particular logic that we as readers expect a chapter to have. We merely wait, having had a breathing space at the end of the last one, to see what it will say.

The numbering of passages is identical in the Legge text.

2:1. The Master said, To conduct government by virtue can be compared to the North Star: it occupies its place, and the many stars bow before it.

This rulership maxim, with its striking image, prepares us for an emphasis on statesmanship in subsequent sayings in this chapter, this being presumably the special interest of whichever disciple (on the standard Hân theory of the text) may have been primarily responsible for it.

2:2. The Master said, The **300 Poems**: if with one word I should epitomize them, it would be “In your thoughts, be without depravity.”

Whatever the philological accuracy of the quote (and the average reader will unquestioningly accept whatever meaning the local context makes necessary), the mention of the 300 poems early in the book keeps one from suspecting that the Shī was not part of Confucius’s repertoire of authorities. The prohibition of “depravity” gives a puritanical spin to the self-cultivation agenda. As for statecraft, there is none; 2:2 (compare 2:4) has an exclusively inward focus.

2:3. The Master said, Lead them with **government**, regulate them by punishments, and the people will evade them with no sense of shame. Lead them with virtue, regulate them by **ritual**, and they will acquire a sense of shame – and moreover, they will be orderly.

The humane, anti-Legalist character of this saying establishes a kindly public character for Confucianism. It also implies that Confucius himself was not only versed in government, but highly enough placed to discourse on it. There is no question of a hard-luck, marginally successful career. As to the lesson of the passage, beyond its governmental insight it affirms the LY 1 idea of ritual as providing the large context for the rest of life.

2:4. The Master said, At fifteen I was determined on **learning**, at thirty I was established, at forty I had no doubts, at fifty I understood the commands of Heaven, at sixty my ears were obedient, and at seventy I may follow what my heart desires **without transgressing** the limits.

The first seeming statement by Confucius *about himself* is a self-cultivation autobiography, with a moral rather than political context, which like LY 1 gives “learning” and not public effectiveness the foreground position. As in 2:3, the psychological insight of the passage, and its transcendent goal, support the concept of Confucius as a sage, as skilled at inner motivation as he is learned in written texts. This is the Confucius of later ages. No amount of politics in what follows can now dislodge the personal-centered implication of LY 1.

2:5. M̀ng Yìdǐ asked about **filiality**. The Master said, Never disobeying. Fán Ch́ was driving, and the Master told him, The descendant of the M̀ng asked me about filiality, and I replied, Never disobeying. Fán Ch́ said, What does that mean? The Master said, When they are alive, serve them with propriety; when they are dead, inter them with **propriety**, and sacrifice to them with **propriety**.

The cleverly put idea of “never disobeying [lǐ]” does several things. It confirms Confucius’s cryptic quality, his willingness to risk misunderstanding; a trait consistent with the philological high-handedness of 2:2. It confirms filiality as a major concern, and lǐ as the core of Confucius’s worldview. And it supports the view of him as a master pedagogue: the school atmosphere of 1:1 is here reinforced with an anecdote in which two disciples figure successively.

2:6. M̀ng Wǔ-bwó asked about filiality. The Master said, When his father and mother are anxious only lest he may fall ill.

This more conventional formulation might lead, and historically did lead, to monstrosities of filial sacrifice that were only occasionally objected to within the increasingly authoritarian later tradition itself (Waley **Yuan** 13f).

2:7. Dǐ-yóu asked about filiality. The Master said, The filiality of the present day: it is merely what one might call being able to provide nourishment. But if we consider the dogs and horses, they all receive their nourishment. If there is no respect, where is the **difference**?

A contrasting, feeling-centered view. A critical reader, discounting the idea that the ancients were more filial, will conclude from 2:7 (against the background of the conventional 2:6) that Confucius was an ethical innovator, emphasizing natural promptings to filiality. Beneath these alternatives is the assumption that filiality was of central concern to Confucius. This impression is now probably proof against any evidence, especially evidence of omission, in later chapters.

2:8. Dǐ-syà asked about filiality. The Master said, The *demeanor* is difficult. If there is work, the younger bear the toil of it; if there are wine and food, the elder get the best portions – did *this* ever count as filiality?

Another seemingly inward-revisionist view of filiality, supporting the inference that Confucius’s historical importance was as an ethical innovator.

2:9. The Master said, I can talk all day with Hwéi, and he never disagrees with me; he seems to be stupid. But if, after he has withdrawn, I observe his personal conduct, it is adequate to serve as an illustration. **Hwéi** is not stupid.

Readers not specially instructed are liable to miss the contrastive “Hwéi” at the end, but this is still an attractive saying, which also has the “surprise” element we will find again later in the text: Confucius admits an error. Since earlier passages have established his preternatural insight, this reduces to an expression of the genial modesty appropriate to a literal sage.

2:10. The Master said, See what he bases himself on, observe what he follows, find out what he is comfortable with. Where can the man hide? Where can the man hide?

A saying seemingly on the general art of judgement; nothing in the immediate context requires the first-time reader to envision a political context for it.

2:11. The Master said, Warming up the old so as to understand the new; such a one can be a **teacher**.

With 2:2, this confirms Confucius’s position as the reinterpreter of a classic text tradition for a later age, and reinforces the authority of the classics themselves.

2:12. The Master said, The **gentleman** is not used as an implement.

Literate modern readers (jyṽndž) will agree in rejecting petty treatment for jyṽndž, but may visualize jyṽndž as cultured men, rather than as supervisors.

2:13. Dž-gùng asked about the gentleman. The Master said, First he carries out his words and then he remains **consistent** with them.

This general description does not evoke a government context, and confirms the impression that Confucius was primarily a teacher, not himself an officeholder or a trainer of future officeholders.

2:14. The Master said, The gentleman is **broad** and not partial; the little man is partial and not broad.

The largeness of mind in 2:12 is here reinforced, and that is about all.

2:15. The Master said, If he **studies** and does not reflect, he will be rigid. If he reflects but does not study, he will be shaky.

This book-learning sense of sywé “learn/study” will prevent the older meaning “acquire by imitation” from ever establishing itself in the text.

2:16. The Master said, If someone attacks from **another end**, he will do harm.

However the technical metaphor (see 9:8) is construed, and despite the more inclusive 2:14, a disapproval of heterodox ideas or postulates will somehow emerge. The only thing wrong with this historically is that it places Confucius in an age of already sharply defined and directly competing ideologies.

2:17. The Master said, Yóu, shall I teach you about knowing? To regard knowing it as knowing it, to regard *not* knowing it as *not* knowing it – *this* is **wisdom**.

Jr 知 here will be taken in its “wisdom” sense, as counseling epistemological modesty, not as a more governmentally focused admonition for the bureaucrat, who needs to be very sure of his sources before he can act on his information. In that larger sense, it unquestionably extends the range of Confucian thought.

2:18. Dž-jāng was studying for a salaried position. The Master said, Hear much but omit what is doubtful, and speak circumspectly of the rest, and you will have few problems. See much but omit what is shaky, and act circumspectly on the rest, and you will have few regrets. If in your words you have few problems, and in your actions you have few regrets, salary will come along in due course.

Without the pairing, this public maxim no longer codefines the scope of 2:17.

2:19. **Aī-gūng** asked, What must I do so that the people will be submissive? Confucius replied, Raise up the straight and put them over the crooked, and the people will be submissive. Raise up the crooked and put them over the straight, and the people will not be submissive.

The fact that Aī-gūng on his first appearance asks about *policy* (not, as in 6:3, about *protégés*) tends to establish an image of Confucius as a virtual minister.

2:20. **Jì Kāngdǐ** asked, To make the people be respectful, loyal, and motivated, what should one do? The Master said, Regard them with austerity, and they will be respectful. Be filial and kind, and they will be loyal. Raise up the good to teach their deficiencies, and they will be motivated.

The adjacency of this and 2:19 with Aī-gūng does not permit a clear vision of the either/or opposition between the Prince and the Jì clan in Confucius's own time, and instead makes him a high-level advisor welcome at any court.

2:21. Someone said to Confucius, Why are you not in government? The Master said, The Shū says, "Be ye filial, only filial, be friendly toward your brothers, and you will contribute to the government." This too, then, is being in government. Why should you speak of being "in government?"

Again the primacy of filiality over service. The reader who regards government as unsavory will not, from anything in LY 2, be moved to think better of it. The allusiveness of Confucius (Shū 49; Legge **Shoo** 535) further supports his image as a learned and cryptic speaker, and that of the Shū itself as pre-Confucian.

2:22. The Master said, A man, but without fidelity: I don't know if that can be. A large cart with no yoke, a small cart with no collar: how shall one make them go?

Fidelity certainly registers as a virtue in this saying, but, again, not in a very strongly implied official context.

2:23. Dǐ-jāng asked whether ten generations hence could be foreknown. The Master said, In the **Yīn**'s continuing with the **Syà rituals**, what they subtracted and added can be known. In the **Jōu**'s continuing with the **Yīn** rituals, what they subtracted and added can be known. And if someone should carry on after the **Jōu**, even though it were a hundred **generations**, it can be known.

The ritual emphasis, the antiquarian emphasis, and the idea of cultural continuity all contribute, long before we reach it in the text, to the image of Confucius as "handing on and not inventing" (7:1) the culture of the past.

2:24. The Master said, If it is not **his own spirit** but he sacrifices to it, he is presumptuous. If he sees what is right and does not do it, he lacks courage.

The general impression from the Analects is that Confucius kept aloof from the supernatural; this saying, however, which seems to take the sacrificial world seriously, gets the consecutive reader off on the wrong foot on this issue.

Chapter Comment

LY 2, like LY 1, abounds in striking observations and vivid images, and makes a strong impression on the reader. It is that much more likely to impose its special angle on perceptions of the Analects as a philosophy.

It cannot be doubted that the ritual/domestic emphasis of LY 1–2 has deeply influenced all later understanding of the Analects and Confucianism. Recent comments defining the family as the core of Confucianism, or least its only presently valid form, include Yu **Remarks** 32, Yü **Remarks** 28, and, from the government level, Zakaria **Culture** 113–115 (compare Kim **Destiny** 191f). For a modern project to define a future Confucianism in terms of the LY 1–2 self-realization ideal (and the JY text which develops that trend), see Tu **Way**.

3

We now come to LY 3, with its unmistakable ritual emphasis, prefigured by the more subtle indications of ritual principles here and there in LY 1–2. Chinese readers from Hàn onward, who knew the Confucians as real-life experts on ceremonial, would have accepted this image as a matter of course.

The numbering of passages is identical in the Legge text.

3:1. The Master said of the head of the **Jì**, Eight rows of dancers performing in his courtyard: if this can be borne, what cannot be borne?

This now seems to criticize the *historical* Jì. “Eight rows” remained a symbol of usurpation; the Japanese chronicle *Nihon Shoki* sv 642 records such a dance (Cranston **Cup** 114f points out that it is a metaphoric allusion to this passage) as being performed by a pretender to Imperial power.

3:2. The **Three Families** exited to the Yūng. The Master said,

Assisting Princes standing by,
And Heaven’s Son in majesty –

where in the halls of the **Three Families** was *this* drawn from?

3:1–2 establish that Confucius *in his lifetime* ranked high enough to see and comment on these ritual abuses. This is the Confucius of the SJ 47 myth.

3:3. The Master said, A man, but not *rǎn*, what has he to do with **ritual**? A man, but not *rǎn*, what has he to do with **music**?

This supports the 1:2 idea of *rǎn* as a basis, here not of social order in general but of the embodiment of that order in appropriate ceremonies.

3:4. Lín Fàng asked about the basis of ritual. The Master said, Great indeed is this question! In ceremonies: than lavish, be rather sparing. In **funerals**: than detached, be rather moved.

The basis (principle) which the question elicits is a frugal one, making the point that even legitimate ceremonies should avoid display.

3:5. The Master said, The Yí and Dí with rulers are not the equal of the several Syà states without them.

This Sinocentric (the text says Syà-centric) concept defines a limit to Chinese “culturalism” which would have been intelligible to Hàn readers in their wars with the Syūng-nú peoples; see SJ 110 (Watson **Records** 2/155f). As with the statecraft interpolations in LY 1–2, this political comment lets LY 3 stand out less as a *chapter*, and thus be more convincing as merely a *segment*, of the text.

3:6. The Jì were going to **sacrifice** to Mount Tàì. The Master said to Rǎn Yǒu, Can you not save the situation? He replied, I cannot. The Master said, Alas! Who will say that Mount Tàì is not as good as Lín Fàng!

3:4 and 3:6 together establish Confucius as primarily a font of wisdom about the conduct of ceremonies: a public teacher rather than a leader.

3:7. The Master said, “Gentlemen never compete.” Surely the exception will be in **archery**? But they bow and yield as they ascend, and drink a toast as they descend: in their competing, they show themselves gentlemen.

The elite sport of archery (mocked as a small skill in 9:2) is here legitimized by reinterpreting it as emblematic, not of virtue, but of ritual.

3:8. Dž-syà asked,

The artful smile so charming, ah,
The lovely eyes so sparkling, ah,
The plain on which to make the painting, ah –

what does it mean? The Master said, The painting comes *after* the plain. He said, Does **ritual** then come *afterward*? The Master said, The one who takes my hint is Shāng; he begins to be talkable-to about the Poetry.

The added line implies (as did 2:2) cavalier treatment of the Shī text, and confirms the idea that the Shī existed during the lifetime of Confucius, a claim which is not made in the historical Analects. As for the Lǚ silk industry, reputable Analects commentaries simply do not discuss such vulgar matters.

3:9. The Master said, The ceremonies of **Syà**: I could discuss them, but Kǐ has not enough evidence. The ceremonies of **Yīn**: I could discuss them, but Sùng has not enough evidence. The reason is that the writings and worthies are not enough. If they *were* enough, I could then give evidence for them.

Again, the words mean the same, but the historical implication is different. This preoccupation of “Confucius” with early dynasties suggests that Confucianism *is not Confucian*, but a transmission of the wisdom of Ancient Oriental Sages to the present degenerate age. This is still the orthodox view in many parts of the world at the present time.

3:10. The Master said, The dī sacrifice from the libation onward – I simply do not wish to see it.

The words of an expert, and, as in 3:1–2, also a political critic. It is significant for the image of Confucius, as it emerges from the present Analects, that his only political passions so far occur in ritual, rather than in statecraft, contexts.

3:11. Someone asked for an explanation of the dī sacrifice. The Master said, I do not know. The relation of one who *did* know to All Under Heaven would be like holding something here. And he pointed to his palm.

An artfully placed later passage (such as 3:10 in the seeming dī-sacrifice pair 3:10/11) has local continuity, and can only be detected by reference to chapter structure. But this is unlikely, since modern scholars (as Schwartz **World** 62 “lack of surface organization”) find that Analects chapters *have* no structure.

3:12. “Sacrifice as though present: sacrifice to spirits as though the spirits were present.” The Master said, If I do not **take part** in the sacrifice, it is as though I did not sacrifice.

More evidence, not of attendance at ceremonies (3:1–2), but of conviction about sacrifices. This disables in advance the “distancing” which in subsequent (though in fact earlier) chapters defines Confucius’s theory of the spirit world.

3:13. Wángsūn Jyǎ asked, “Than beseech the alcove, rather beseech the stove” – what does this mean? The Master said, It is not true. One who has incurred guilt toward Heaven has no one to whom he can pray.

This too depicts Confucius (contrast 7:35) as a conventionally religious man.

3:14. The Master said, Jōu could look back upon the **Two Dynasties**. How splendid was its culture! And we follow Jōu.

In present context, likelier to be read as antiquarian than as developmental.

3:15. The Master entered the Great Shrine, and at every stage asked questions. Someone said, Who says this son of a man of Dzōu knows ritual? At every stage he asks questions. The Master said, *That* is the ritual.

If the Analects were more widely memorized in our culture, this would serve as an admirable comeback at the overbearing hauteur of some tour guide.

3:16. The Master said, In archery one does not emphasize the hide, because strengths may not be at the same level. This was the old way.

As with the Syà dynasty, above, the lack of an evolutionary Warring States context for these sayings is liable to give them greater credence among readers as a literal picture of “older ways” as seen from Confucius’s vantage point.

3:17. Dž-gūng wanted to do away with the sacrificial lamb at the Announcement of the New Moon. The Master said, Sž, you grudge the lamb; I grudge the **ritual**.

We have here Confucius not only as a ritual expert, but as an opponent of ritual evolution. This is challenged by the reasonableness toward change shown in 9:3, but the casual reader may never even get as far as 9:3, and will in any case recall from 3:16–17 that Confucius preferred the ancient ways.

3:18. The Master said, If one served one’s ruler observing every last detail of propriety, people would regard it as obsequious.

A reader may miss the “mitigation” function of this originally paired saying. Mitigated or not, the personal acceptance of ritual in 3:17 is undeniable.

3:19. Dìng-gūng asked, When a ruler employs a minister, when a minister serves a ruler – how should it be? Confucius answered, The ruler employs the minister with propriety; the minister serves the ruler with loyalty.

The humanistic potential of this statement will be either lost in the statement about ritual, or, if found, attributed to the time of Confucius or earlier. One of the most vital lessons that the panorama of the original, chronological Analects has for us in modern times is that the elements of an emerging civil polity in China *were not always there*: they were achieved gradually, at a certain time and in a certain historical and even material context. They were, in the end, the hard-won achievement of men and not the gratuitous gift of ancient sages.

3:20. The Master said, The **Gwān-jyw**: happy but not licentious; sad but not wounded.

A reader will attribute the subtle psychology of Shī 1 to the early Jōu dynasty, instead of reading it as evidence of Warring States sensibilities. As usually read, the Analects attests the antiquity of the Shī, and vice versa.

3:21. Aī-gūng asked about the shù from Dzǎi Wǒ. Dzǎi Wǒ replied, The Syàhòu clan used a pine, the Yīn people used a cypress, the Jōu people used a chestnut, saying it would make the populace be in fear and trembling. The Master heard of it and said, What is over one does not analyze, what is done with one does not reprove, what has passed away one does not blame.

Even the disciples are loremasters. The dissonance between this Dzǎi Wǒ and the renegade of 5:10a/b will inevitably be resolved in favor of the “earlier” 3:21.

3:22. The Master said, Gwǎn Jùng’s capacity was small indeed! Someone said, Was Gwǎn Jùng frugal? He said, Gwǎn had three wives, and among his officers there were no concurrent duties; how could *he* be frugal? If so, then did Gwǎn Jùng understand ritual? He said, Rulers of states have a gate screen; Gwǎn also had a gate screen. When rulers of states celebrate the amity between two rulers, they have a cup stand; Gwǎn also had a cup stand. If Gwǎn understood ritual, who does *not* understand ritual?

This wonderful retort ranks with the subtler, more arch rejoinder of 3:15.

3:23. The Master, discussing music with the Lǔ Grand Preceptor, said, The art of music, or the part of it that may be understood, is that when it first begins, it is tentative, but as it continues along, it settles down, it brightens up, it opens out; and so it comes to an end.

One hates to admit it, but readers simply tend to skip this sort of passage.

3:24. The borderman of Yí asked to be presented; he said, Whenever a gentleman comes to this place, I have never failed to be presented to him. The followers presented him. When he came out, he said, You disciples, why do you worry about failure? That All Under Heaven has not had the Way has long indeed been true. Heaven is going to make of your Respected Master a wooden gong.

This intrusion makes hermits appear early in the text, and to that extent supports the nursery tale idea of Lǎudž as the contemporary of Confucius.

3:25. The Master said of the Sháu that it was wholly beautiful and also wholly good. He said of the Wǔ that it was wholly beautiful, but not wholly good.

How many readers will see the music link to 3:23, across the interrupting 3:24? Especially when the “wooden gong” tocsin in 3:24 confuses the issue?

3:26. The Master said, Occupying high position without magnanimity, performing rituals without assiduousness, attending funerals without grief – how can I look on at such things?

Probably to be seen as the end, and not the envoi, of this intricate chapter.

Chapter Summary

Besides the legitimacy theme (3:1–2), HSWJ extracts from LY 3 only 3:8 (Hightower **Wai** 93), on Shī expertise (HSWJ *teaches* Shī expertise). Only the householder’s manual LY 10 affords HSWJ so little moral raw material. LY 3 thus deepens ritual, but without widening the ethical scope of LY 1–2.

4

The preceding three chapters have established a personal/domestic/ritual tone for the Analects, but what if a reader were still paying attention as of LY 4?

The numbering of passages is identical in the Legge text.

4:1. The Master said, It is best to dwell in *rǎn*. If he choose not to abide in *rǎn*, how will he get to be **wise**?

Wisdom (no longer despised practical “knowledge” but an acknowledged virtue) is now, in the new whole-Analects context, the goal of 4:1.

4:2. The Master said, He who is not *rǎn* cannot for long abide in privation; cannot forever abide in happiness. The *rǎn* are content with *rǎn*; the **wise** turn *rǎn* to their advantage.

With the shift of *jì* 知 to a positive value (“wisdom,” compare 2:17), there is no sarcasm to keep “advantage” from also becoming a positive term. Scandalous.

4:3. The Master said, It is only the *rǎn* who can like others; who can hate others.

Waley finds this license for dislike out of order, and harmonizes it with the “niceness” sense of *rǎn* by making 4:3 a maxim Confucius quotes in order to reject it; with Lau, we instead respect the obvious meaning of the text.

4:4. The Master said, If once he sets his mind on *rǎn*, he will **be without evil**.

Lau, who interprets the passage thus, sacrifices the balancing 4:3 to harmonize instead with the goal of inner self-improvement. This draws strength from the cryptic maxim of 2:2 (whose *syé* 邪 “depravity” matches the present *è* 惡 “evil”).

4:5. The Master said, Wealth and honor: these are what everyone desires, but if he cannot do so in accordance with his principles, he will not abide in them. Poverty and lowliness: these are what everyone hates, but if he cannot do so in accordance with his principles, he will not avoid them. If the gentleman avoid *rǎn*, how shall he **live up to** that name? A gentleman does not for the space of a meal depart from *rǎn*. In direst straits he cleaves to it; in deepest distress he cleaves to it.

This uncompromisingly sacrificial loyalty to one’s own principles cannot but get at least the temporary attention of the most LY 1–3 preconditioned reader. It leaves a trace with which the end of the chapter can then perhaps resonate.

4:6. The Master said, For my part, I have never seen anyone who loved *rǎn* and hated the not-*rǎn*. One who loved *rǎn* would put nothing else above it. One who hated the not-*rǎn* would already himself be *rǎn*; he would not let the not-*rǎn* come near his person. Is there anyone who for a single day has put forth all his strength on *rǎn*? For my part, I have never seen anyone whose *strength* was not sufficient for it. There may be some, but, for my part, I have never seen one.

This last-ditch devotion to *rǎn* again strikes a note of seriousness, but exactly what sort of *rǎn* it is that a reader is supposed to be devoted to? The strenuousness of the passage is somehow at odds with the familial *rǎn* of 1:2. One solution is to infer a strenuous filial piety like that of MC 5A1 (Legge **Mencius** 342).

4:7. The Master said, In making mistakes, people stay true to type. If you observe their mistakes, you will be able to tell what sort of rǎn they have.

Legge disapproves the import of this saying, quoting a none-too-relevant line from Goldsmith; Dawson ethicalizes it by making a general “understanding of humaneness” its goal. By this empirical test, at least one early statecraft maxim has been wholly neutralized in the arrangement of the present Analects text.

4:8. The Master said, If in the morning he should hear of the **Way**, and that night he should die, it is enough.

The “Way” is usually understood as a transcendent (Legge “the right way,” Soothill “the truth,” Lau “hear about the Way”), not a political, desideratum (Wilhelm “dass die Welt in Ordnung sei,” Mao **Suggestions** 284), consistently with the self-cultivation emphasis in LY 1–2. The line itself may feel like the realization of a political goal, but the perceived trend of the book will easily overwhelm the feel of any one line. What then is a reader to do?

Trust the feel. Waley remarks “The appeal, even in philosophical texts, has always been to emotion rather than logic” (**Notes** 187). Recall Churchill’s broadcast to the people of occupied France, quoting Gambetta: “Think of it always, speak of it never,” and “For the morning will come” (**Hour** 512).

4:9. The Master said, If an officer is dedicated to the **Way**, but is ashamed of having bad clothes or bad food, he is not worth taking counsel with.

The mention of taking counsel, with its unavoidable goal of public service, does at last resist absorption in the larger general-ethics context imposed by the proposed chapters. For a Hân reader, in an age when service was virtually the only aim of learning, there would have been a countervailing service context, but for readers in later, more scholastic periods, LY 1–2 become very cogent.

4:10. The Master said, The gentleman’s relation to the world is thus: he has no predilections or prohibitions. When he regards something as right, he sides with it.

This saying was later influential in inhibiting “factional” combinations of Confucians in support of a particular policy. However honorable in principle, this taboo may in the long run have done more to weaken than strengthen Imperial-period Confucianism.

4:11. The Master said, The gentleman likes virtue; the little man likes partiality. The gentleman likes justice; the little man likes mercy.

Another sanction against “partiality” and against practical politics, much of which involves groups that are for something and against something else. The disapproval of *permanent* issue-defined groups may however be a sound idea; it is the nature of an issue group to want to make permanent the particular discontent on which it is founded. Modern societies too have had trouble seeing how public life can be organized without becoming polarized.

4:12. The Master said, Those who act with a view to their own personal advantage will arouse much resentment.

The fairness principle will readily detach itself, for a modern reader, from the LY 1–2 context. Here, historically, is an anticipation of the more inclusive fairness concept reached in LY 19–20. If the modern reader gets that far.

4:13. The Master said, If you *can* run the country with courtesy and deference, what is the obstacle? But if you *cannot* run it with courtesy and deference, what good is courtesy?

Here lurks the idea of ritual as providing a civil context for cooperation in government, and also the *importance* of civil cooperation in government.

4:14. The Master said, He does not worry that he has no position; he worries about whether he is qualified to hold one. He does not worry that no one recognizes his worth; he seeks to become worthy to be recognized.

The feudal value of never acting above one's station was an unfortunate idea to build into a system which would later cope with more than feudal pressures. But it is clear that for the last page we have been prescribing *for* a political system, and that is a major gain. Remonstrance will recur later (4:18, 4:26).

4:15. The Master said, Shǔm! My Way: by one thing I link it together. Dzǔngdǔ said, Yes. When the Master went out, the disciples said, What did he mean? Dzǔngdǔ said, Our Respected Master's Way is simply loyalty and empathy.

Here is the claim of a unified doctrine, which the reader will regard as original. It states two principles. One is loyalty, which a modern reader will take in the modern (04c/03c) sense of national, not feudal loyalty. It sums up the vertical aspect; shù “empathy, reciprocity” is the lateral aspect. Together, they give a two-axis view of how society holds together. Note, if one can after LY 3, that no divine sanction is involved: the state is the common concern of those who comprise it. As political theory, loyalty and empathy both coincide and suffice.

4:16. The Master said, The gentleman concentrates on right; the little man concentrates on advantage.

This corrects the above: the narrow self-interest of some people in society is a problem for society. The Analects does not solve the problem of how to handle them. But it is obvious that it is easier to do so in an elite politics, where the microculture of the elite can be required as a condition for entry into the elite.

4:17. The Master said, When he sees a worthy man, let him think how he might come up to him; when he sees an unworthy man, let him examine within himself.

If not lost in the larger self-cultivation mandate of LY 1–2, this reminds us that even those born into the ruling circle of society need to labor ethically to become *fully functioning* members of that society.

4:18. The Master said, In serving father and mother, he remonstrates gently. If he sees that his ideas are not followed, then he again becomes dutiful without disobedience, and energetic without resentment.

This passage allows difference of opinion but not denial of duty; it defines a rudimentary “loyal opposition” in the family, and by extension in the polity.

4:19. The Master said, While his father and mother are alive, he does not travel far; if he does travel, he must have a definite destination.

Hampering as a modern practical Mician may find this, it is not all wrong to keep the sensibilities of high government figures in touch with specific needs, and the needs of one's own parents are admirably handy for the purpose.

4:20. The Master said, If for three years he does not change from the ways of his father, he may be called filial.

Even in the rigorous form it took in later periods, the three-year mourning implied here was not as disruptive of public life as the Micicians anticipated; see the perceptive comment in Waley **Three** 132–133 (PB 97). As to subordination within the family, it is not forever; time gives everyone their turn.

4:21. The Master said, The ages of one’s father and mother cannot but be known. In the one case, he will be happy; in the other, he will be anxious.

Merely domestic, and enforcing LY 1–2, but now compare the following:

4:22. The Master said, If the words of those of old did not readily issue forth, it was that they were ashamed lest they should not come up to them.

The unassuming way of those who take seriously the assuming of public duty.

4:23. The Master said, Those who err on the side of strictness are few.

Balances the above; not adding to it, but structurally emphasizing it.

4:24. The Master said, The gentleman wants to be slow in giving his word, but quick in carrying it out.

And again. What I tell you three times is true.

4:25. The Master said, Virtue is not solitary; it must have neighbors.

The social and public nature of virtue, offsetting the domestic-piety emphasis.

4:26. Dž-yóu said, If in serving his ruler he is accusatory, he will be disgraced. If with friends he is accusatory, he will become estranged from them.

The bombshell is that one might *be* accusatory with a ruler. This, if obliquely, annexes the whole “censorial” tradition, as expressed elsewhere in the text. In the light of the 4:15 loyalty/reciprocity key, we see that there is also to be reciprocity *along the vertical axis*. This establishes a final symmetry in the political geometry of the Analects. Given support from the beginning of LY 4, this saying allows a role for opinion, and thus permits *politics from below*.

It may be wise to grant the LY 4 point that partisanship is dangerous. Oppositions tend to become institutionalized, and thus to exert an ongoing structural inhibition on cooperation in government. How to allow opinion without giving it a structure of its own is a major dilemma which the text itself, followed by its present annotators, leave as a final project for the reader.

Chapter Comment

We have only two points, in parting for the last time from the Analects. One is the *overt* power of the preposed chapters to shift the text thematically away from its predominantly political focus to their own largely personal and domestic agenda. The simple device of preposing elements is very effective in practice: first impressions tend to be last impressions. But the second point is the *latent* power of older sayings, represented here by LY 4, notwithstanding these late transpositions, and in part because of the presence of even *later* additions within LY 1–4, to convey the original fire of Confucius, along with the insights of his successors: the almost lost political tradition of the Analects.