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| Spring and Autumn China | |
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| A
Taeko Brooks, University of Massachusetts
at Amherst
Disclaimer This summary is based on (a) a thorough study and re-dating of the major Warring States texts, leading in part to (b) a preference for the Chun/Chyou (CC) or "Spring and Autumn" chronicle of Lu over the Dzwo Jwan (DJ) and other later documents, as the sole valid contemporary source, other than inscriptions and archaeology, for the period which is named after it. The standard scholarly view is instead firmly based on the DJ, and rejects the CC at the many points where the two give different accounts of the period. The points below thus conflict with standard sources. Readers both inside and outside the Sinological field must weigh the evidence, and make their choices, for themselves. Topics Following are some details on selected topics likely to interest comparative historians. They take for granted the background information given in the Epitome. They have in mind the major states, and ignore the tiny entities, whether states or mere settlements, which play no role in the multi-state system as such. Our data is chiefly about Lu (a medium-sized eastern state), and is scanty for other states. The social and perhaps also the ideological systems of the other states did differ (especially the non-Sinitic states), though we cannot be sure of more than a few details of those differences. Government. During the whole of the Spring and Autumn period, state government was in the hands of a hereditary ruler. Bloody succession disputes occurred. Delegation of function was initially temporary, and solely to relatives of the ruler, some of these gradually establishing powerful collateral clans. As the period progressed, some non-kin came to receive temporary assignments, or to hold some of the few positions with names, such as da-fu "great officer." At the end of the period, there existed no more than an incipient bureaucracy in any of these states. Government had these purposes: (1) Agriculture and food. Grain (chiefly millet in the north) was stored in some quantities, and all crops and any famines or droughts were at least monitored. Farmland was continually extended, and crops and farming techniques were, evidently, continually improved, during the period. By the end of Spring and Autumn, remaining forest had to be enclosed to preserve it for ruler hunting. Increasing ecosystem stress is implied in the record. (2) Sacrifices to a variety of ancestral or agricultural spirits. The sacrificial calendar became more complicated during the period. There was nothing like a religion separate alike from ruler ancestral cults and local agricultural spirits, and common to the whole population of a state, or to the several states. There was nothing like a Delphic oracle, and no temples as public places, sanctuaries, or foci of wealth. (3) War and defense against war. Major cities, later also some minor ones, were walled. It is assumed that a military elite received land allocations in return for service at the ruler's call. All details of land tenure unclear in this period. There are no signs of government interest in or involvement with (4) trade or commerce, though we know from archaeology that these did exist, or (5) the people, who are never mentioned in the record, and only implied as food producers. Government ideology, presumably including elite ideology, included these features in this period: (1) Some acceptance of the Jou successor rulers as ceremonially at the top of the interstate relational system, (2) Identification of the ruler with, and as solely able to speak for, the state, and thus (3) Protection of the dignity of a state's own ruler from association with a military defeat or other bad event, and (4) a one-way loyalty and service ethic defining the duties of the elite warrior toward the ruler. Diplomacy Especially from c0650 on, when Lu at least became more fully articulated with the rest of the states in the system, states more or less regularly kept each other informed of things like ruler deaths and successions, and perhaps some other major protocol-related events, including strange omens and civil disturbances. Gifts of condolence were common if not invariable. Envoys were sent between states on particular occasions (there were no permanent ambassadors, in contrast to the Italian situation). Interstate travel was dangerous, and envoys were sometimes captured and killed by rival state, or non-state, forces. Friendly visits of rulers (with military escort) also took place, sometimes of long duration. An important aspect of interstate diplomacy is interstate marriages between ruling (or major ruler-related clan) houses. The Jou or Sinitic states practiced exogamy, giving a cultural context for interstate marriages which may often have had, as a second purpose, the strengthening of interstate ties. Meetings between rulers or their delegates were frequent. These dealt with mutual problems, including civil disturbances or military threats, and interstate disputes. Solutions were sometimes reached by agreement, sometimes imposed by force; sometimes problems were not successfully dealt with. Some meetings ended in, or prepared for, formal covenants. Covenants were not permanent, and insofar as they were effective, they bound the ruler, not the state (there was no separate conceptual entity of "state"). Covenanting parties were in a limited sense equals; the great states can be assumed to dominate, but the protocol order in which the parties are listed in the record only reflects this fact to a limited extent. Alliances As noted, covenants were temporary in nature, and in any case subject to violation, usually without repercussions on the terrestrial plane (it does happen that states combine to - apparently - punish a treaty violation). There were no permanent alliances in this period. There were instead (a) an overlapping series of major powers (including Jin, Chu, Wu) which dominated interstate relations simply by their strength, and (b) a certain sense that the large non-Sinitic state Chu was the common enemy of the largely Sinitic northern states. Covenants aimed at joint military actions against Chu have the exceptional name "tung mvng ~ "common cause" rather than simply mvng "covenant." The state of Jvng was a frequent swing member in this incipient north/south opposition, each side attempting to secure its allegiance, or punish its defection. There was also (3) a tendency for the Sinitic states to combine against the non-state peoples Rung and Di, though this did not prevent alliance of individual states with Rung and Di against Sinitic state opponents, or intermarriage of Rung and Di with Sinitic rulers or heirs. Temporary and local needs, as with the Greek states and their incipient proto-federal alliances (see Sealey), could always overrule any general tendency or (from some retrospective points of view) common political interest. War Battles and other military actions, large and small, were common throughout the period. At the beginning, states had limited military force, and (it seems) only one field army; when this was on campaign, the capital was left relatively undefended. The military arm was a relatively small elite chariot force, supported by a limited number of foot soldiers and/or attendants. It was mustered at need, and between campaigns was dispersed to (one assumes) the landholdings of the individual warriors. Weapons were probably at least in part procured and distributed by the court. The force had walling as well as combat missions. States in this period often did not have enough army for their perceived military purposes, and in addition to joint campaigns, one state would sometimes borrow the army of another for a temporary and specific purpose. War was purposive, rather than ritual or cultural. It tended to observe the agricultural rhythm (summer and winter are slightly more common than spring or fall as campaign seasons), but armies were not staffed from the rural masses. Attacks, raids, the unopposed taking of towns or territory, sieges, and relief of sieges, were among the types of military action. Armies were also used to provide, or command, walling or unwalling parties. Duration of campaigns is unknown in many cases, but where known ranged from 1 to 10 months. Stated aims of military operations included: (1) acquisition of territory, (2) acquisition of population, (3) booty, or acquisition of plundered valuables, this being rare, and still more rarely (4) acquisition of the opposing force, presumably as an augmentation of one's own force. (Defection of individuals, chiefly warriors, from one state to another, where they were employed and even sometimes honored, is well documented in the CC). The following motives seem entirely absent: (4) military glory per se; in fact victories are never mentioned in the record, only defeats; and (5) captives for sacrifice (contrast the Maya); indeed, the Sinitic states tended to deplore the non-Sinitic practice of human sacrifice. Some elementary tactical principles can be shown to exist. One is the device of striking not at the enemy state's army (as in trying to raise a siege) but against its undefended capital. This implies a state which can field only one fighting force, and thus a still low level of military power, even in the great states such as Chu. Another is simultaneous campaigns against different points in an enemy state, only one of which it can adequately defend. This occurs only late in the period (and is undertaken only by Chi), and implies a transition to more abundant state military forces. This increasing adequacy of state military power will continue in the following Warring States period, and will indeed define part of the distinctiveness of that period. In the Spring and Autumn period, military operations are consistently marked by tactical and strategic frugality. In sum, Spring and Autumn warfare was limited, but businesslike. Military skill was the prime virtue of the typical Spring and Autumn head of state, and the defining quality of its non-ruler elite. Provision for military needs can be posited, without contradiction from the evidence, as the ultimate aim of Spring and Autumn state resource management. Summary It is worth emphasizing that one distinctive feature of the classic Chinese multi-state system and its culture is the relative advance in the technology of ruling, over the technology of (eg) wealth. The state could at its option ignore, suppress, or co-opt, any development, whether political, commercial, or cultural, which might be initiated from below. The absence of lateral relationships among individuals, and of public or cooperative institutions apart from state institutions, is in strong contrast with the classic Greek situation. We explain this by (a) simply the chance result of relative development, and also by (b) the fact that the Chinese states retained a memory of a prior single sovereignty, and themselves entered the multi-state period with, in some cases, considerable territory and a long experience with local rulership. There was in China no Dark Ages period, after which society could be reinvented locally, and polity could be evolved anew out of cooperative enterprise. This relative advancement of the technology of rule over all other technological trends and advances remains true, and indeed determinative, for all later Chinese history. I believe it is the single most important fact about China.
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