|
| Prolegomena | |
|
| Prolegomena
The conference will be a success if each participant goes home stimulated by one new idea, but the result at which it aims is to clarify the concept of a multi-state system, as a recurring historical situation. Our preliminary definition of such a system is "several politically independent states with some degree of common culture including language, and in reasonably close contact with each other." We wish to see if a study of cases turns up any other elements which may fruitfully be attributed to the multi-state system as such. We hope to avoid some of the pitfalls exemplified by the Coulborn volume on Feudalism, and to that end suggest that the following not be foci of this preliminary discussion, or initially assumed as among the defining criteria for a multi-state system. They may well emerge as such during discussion. 1. Origin. The Chinese states did, and the Greek states, did not, have a historical memory of a preceding period characterized by some form of overall sovereignty. We don't wish, on those grounds, to disqualify either of them from further consideration. We prefer to leave this and similar differences in play simply as differences, which may play a part in the outcome question (see #5 below), but for our purposes are simply part of the varying cultural inventory of particular cases. 2. Sequence. More generally, we do not assume that a multi-state system must either follow or precede a different condition of things. Such findings may emerge from the study, but we do not wish to establish them as assured predictions. We prefer to leave aside the "necessary sequence" question for the time being, whether in its Hesiodic or its Marxist form. 3. Society. We note that the ancient examples on which we concentrate depart in many ways from their modern counterparts (such as the dominance in some of beliefs in gods or spirits, the absence or different character of "rational choice" economics, or the presence of a significant slave population), and do not assume any particular form of social order or hierarchy, or any one underlying ideology. 4. Duration. We are only interested in cases lasting for at least two centuries, but we do not assume that these systems as such must either collapse or be unified after a certain time. We also don't assume inherent stability. We don't assume anything in this area. We simply want to begin by considering cases that last long enough to leave a record of development, or its absence, over the period studied. 5. Outcome. The Indian states were unified under Chandragupta, and the Three Kingdoms of Korea led to a single Korean state, but the Greek states never envisioned unification as a desirable goal, and the Maya states may have been brought to an end in part by natural causes. These interesting details should not be grounds for admission or rejection of a given possible instance. As earlier noted, we wish for the moment to focus on how the system functioned while it lasted, not why it ended. Aspects to Consider On the other hand, we suggest the following as possibly useful points at which to begin examining and comparing specific instances: 1. Tendency Toward Competition. Cultural variables may be relevant, and we use this topic to highlight the importance of cultural variables such as warlikeness or ideological elements such as a shared aspiration toward a common polity, or the lack of it. 2. Ethnic Homogeneity. Was there, in fact, a single culture with local variants (as seems largely true for the Maya), or a mixture of several cultures (as apparently in the early Chinese case)? It has been denied that the "Dorian/Ionian line" means anything in the classical Greek centuries. Does this hold up under scrutiny? 3. Tendency Toward Convergence. Competition, especially in war, tends to make units become more like each other. This is an axiom of the "systems" approach. On the other hand, units may begin by being very like each other, so that the question of convergence hardly arises. And a question of divergence might arise: opposition hardening into polarization, which is then reinforced by further hostile contact. 4. Tendency Toward Innovation. Competitive systems may, exceptionally, encourage innovations which it is presumed most cultures "at rest" routinely inhibit. The Chinese Warring States and the European Renaissance states would seem to be textbook examples of forced-draft technological and cultural innovation. War is the prime area in which this is obvious, but civil culture also innovates drastically and decisively in these periods. Other examples may not support a generalization. What elements in a system tend to encourage this trait? 5. Self-Sufficiency. Could the states feed themselves, or were they in an intrinsic competition for external resources? Could they undertake military adventures on their own (the early Chinese states could not), or did they need to develop alliances and other structures of collaboration? 6. Size and Range. In other ways than the above, the absolute size and range of the system units may well be important, as studies of the Greek polis (etc) have suggested. Certain kinds of competition, even in the absence of literal conquest, may make the system not viable, past a certain point, for smaller units. It has been suggested (we think usefully) that the chief technological advantage in the Chinese competition was not iron weapons, or territory as such, but the skill to rule conquered territory directly, and thus to manage a larger area. This amounts to political (as vs military) technology. 7. Interlock. Apart from interludes of war, how did the various states in the system recognize or interact with each other? Was there a recognized sphere of diplomacy, with its own subculture (apparently this was true in both the Chinese and Greek cases, and was of course well developed in the Italian case). Were there trade blocs that tended to unite groups of states, and were those blocs steps toward other kinds of quasi-unification as well? Was there a constant sense of mutual awareness and acknowledgement, or did units closely engage each other principally in times of war? 8. Internal Structure. Is the structure of a single state replicated in aspects of the structure of the system? Does the structure of the single state tend to change over the period in question? This is manifestly so of the Chinese states, which undergo a transition from personalistic rulership to bureaucratically supported rulership. The position of the lower population also becomes more visible and more important. Social hierarchy as such is not a forbidden topic, though it is a popular one, and we don't want it to usurp discussion of other points. 9. Laterality. We isolate this internal-structure element for special consideration. We suspect that the Greek case, where government is determined by the community, and lateral social structures abound, may be very exceptional in human history. Early Chinese society, for instance, seems wholly to lack laterality structures (there is not even a social rubric of "forgiveness"), or to oppose those which tend to emerge. 10. Divided Authority. The Greek temples in some sense existed apart from any one Greek polis government (the Delphic oracle would be one example), and functioned in some ways as countervailing structures. Greek and Near Eastern temples evidently served as banking centers in their own right, for early trade. The European mediaeval church/state situation amounts to a system of parallel governments, legal traditions, and career structures. This, again, seems to be very unusual in human history as a whole. We find only incipient cases of such independent authority in the Chinese case: no temples apart from rulers' ancestral shrines, no public access to capital, no second law code or other set of countervailing public sanctions, no recognized right of sanctuary, and so on. The doings of the state are obviously magnified in their effect if there is no second authority structure in parallel with it, in its own domain, to offer an alternative or a brake. 11. Relative Development. We do not assume that there is a single developmental model for human institutions On the contrary, we find that cultural elements such as law and statecraft are free to vary in their degree of relative development in particular cases. So also trade, which was relatively rudimentary in early China. Ways of making money (even involving what one can only call increased industrial efficiency) existed in early China, but they were systematically either suppressed or co-opted by the much more developed state. We thus find that political technology was advanced relative to economic technology in early China, and that this fact goes far to explain the suppression or control of commerce in that culture, but we do not erect this observation into an expectation that other cases will exhibit the same relationship. The modern US is an example (in our view) of a highly advanced economic sector being in some senses more powerful than the relatively weak or primitive political sector. It may also not be completely for nothing that the British have been called "a nation of shopkeepers:" the influence on public policy of British commercial interests, over recent centuries, is manifest. Neither of these two cases refutes the other; they are merely examples of different relative development within a society.
As the prediscussion develops, we will be very glad to modify or extend this preliminary sketch in response to suggestions from participants, or from the general public.
All lectures and abstracts posted on this site are Copyright © by their authors. 19 Apr 2002 / Contact The Project / Conferences Page |
